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Abstract  
 
 
Chapter 1 of this study investigates the link between a firm’s capital structure and their industry 
competitive behavior.  Given the competitive behavior in certain markets, Cournot or Bertrand, 
we investigate if there are any inborn characteristics of these markets’ competitive behavior that 
would create an incentive for Cournot firms to have a different strategic debt level than Bertrand 
firms.  Related theories argue that any industry’s competitive behavior, whether it is Bertrand or 
Cournot would typically consist of a certain type of debt and pursue a certain type of competitive 
strategy, based on its classification.  In this study, we investigate the debt level of a sample of 
firms classified into either Cournot or Bertrand competition, i.e. explore competitive behavior as 
a characteristic of firms that tend to be associated with different debt ratios and determine if the 
competitive market type does in fact lead to a varying debt ratio target.  We used two different 
measures to categorize competition type, the CSM and the SI measure.  Our findings indicate 
that there is no significant difference between differentiated debt levels between Bertrand and 
Cournot firms.       
 
 
 
Chapter 2 of the study examines various factors that may affect American Depository Receipts’ 
trading volume distribution between their home and US markets. These include factors not 
previously considered in the extant literature.  One such factor is the trading motive (hedging or 
speculative) of investors.  Other factors examined include price impact, relative volatility, market 
to book ratio, as well as a cultural dimension factor: individualism.  Controlling for time-specific 
effects, we find that the relative motive measure of cross-listed firms has a positive relationship 
on the trading volume distribution.  In addition, when looking at a small sample of firms with 
different motive factors, we find that hedging motive in the home country leads to an increased 
proportion of trading in the host country relative to the home country, while speculative motive 
leads to a decrease in the volume share of the host country relative to the home country.  A 
positive and significant relationship is also observed between volatility and the log of trading 
volume share.  The relationship is negative for liquidity and visibility in relation to the trading 
volume distribution of cross-listed firm’s stocks.  Culture difference at home relative to host is 
found to positively impact trading volume distribution of cross-listed stocks. 
 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Product market competition, Cournot, Bertrand; 
Cross-listing, American depository receipts, ADR, Volume distribution, Trading Volume, Trading Motives, 
Hedging, Speculation
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Chapter 1: DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN PRODUCT 
MARKET COMPETITION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 Capital structure theories fall under three categories:  the Static Trade-off Theory of 
Optimal Debt, the Pecking Order Theory, and the Signaling Theory1.  The Trade-off Theory2 
argues that there is an optimal capital structure and the way to optimize this capital structure is 
by trading off the cost and benefits of debts.  In other words, the optimal capital structure is the 
point at which the marginal benefit is exactly equal to the marginal cost of debt.  Under this 
theory, many factors, such as taxes, bankruptcy, agency, free cash flow, and product market 
interaction factors have been identified to provide benefits or costs from using debt, and the 
trade-offs between these benefits and costs will lead to well-defined target debt ratios.   
 In this study, we will address a firm’s capital structure in terms of their product market 
strategy, specifically capital structure of firms in oligopolistic market.  An oligopoly market 
refers to an imperfectly competitive market with a small number of relatively large firms that sell 
differentiated or homogenous products and are aware of their interdependence.  Oligopoly 
behavior is modeled as 1) Cournot with simultaneous choice of output quantity, and then price 
adjusts so that demand equals supply or 2) Bertrand with simultaneous choice of prices and then 
consumers choose from which firm to buy.   
 Traditionally, firms financing decisions and their behavior in the product market have 
been studied separately.  Studies by Brander and Lewis (1986) and Showalter (1995 and 1999) 
were among the first to recognize that a firm’s capital structure and product market behavior may 
be interrelated.  The need to study capital structure in terms of product market strategy arises 
from the fact that market forms, such as oligopoly, stimulate the awareness and responsiveness 
of firms to the actions of its competitors.  Such actions may pertain to a firm’s chosen debt level 
since financing and output decisions are closely linked.  It follows then that the capital structure 
of a firm will be changed by the existing competitive behavior in the industry.  In other words, 
competitive behavior is a factor that may hamper a firm’s ability to make required changes to 
                                                             
 
 
 
1
 For detail on the pecking order theory, the signaling theory and the theory of optimal capital structure, see Harris 
and Raviv (2012).  Although product market research can be associated to both the Pecking and the signaling theory 
as well, this paper focuses on how it relates to the Static Trade off Theory.   
2
 See Baxter, 1967; and Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973 
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bring about a target debt level since financial distress costs may arise if competitors take 
advantage and compete more aggressively when the firm in question is financially weakened3.     
 This paper contributes to this research area by asking the following question: “Would one 
expect to see firms with a higher level of average debt in a Cournot or Bertrand market?”  In 
other words, evaluating the average debt of two industries where one is predominantly price 
competitive while the other competes primarily on quantity. Are there any inborn characteristics 
of these markets’ competitive behavior that would create an incentive for firms in one industry to 
gain a higher average level of debt than firms from the other industries4?  We examine the 
interaction between leverage and product market competition separately for two samples of 
Cournot and Bertrand firms.  We distinguish between Cournot and Bertrand firms based on an 
empirical measure of strategic substitutes and strategic complements by Sundaram, John, and 
John (1996).  We also implement a second measure of competitive environment, the strategic 
indicator measure “SI” proposed by Kedia, 2006.  This alternative measure addresses some of 
the weaknesses perceived from Sundaram, John, and John (1996) CSM measure.  To compare 
debt levels, we evaluate the interaction between leverage and firms’ market structure through 
analysis of the two-direction effect between firm’s leverage level and firm’s competition 
measure5 in each market type (Cournot and Bertrand competition), as well as over different 
industries.   
 
 
                                                             
 
 
3
 Opler and Titman (1994).  
4
 If there exists no difference in debt ratio across the two groups, that need not imply that the product market 
strategy does not affect debt ratios; it may be that the conduit through which the market structure affects debt ratio 
for each group is different.  If, however, a difference is found, the study could be further extended and seek to 
identify the underlying characteristics that justify this difference in debt level.   
5
 Firms’ competitive measure, the toughness or softness of the product market competition, is estimated by industry 
concentration (HHI) and (CONC), and the degree of competition measure as the Boone indicator (BOONE). 
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2. Literature Review  
 
 
 Brander and Lewis (1986) were among the first to survey the relationship between the 
product markets and financial markets.  They point to the interaction between output and 
financial markets as a determinant of financial structure.  They assessed the link between firm’s 
choice of debt level and output decisions in a two-stage Cournot competition model.  They 
suggested that firms in Cournot markets have an incentive to commit to a large output strategy, 
inducing favorable output reduction from competitors6.  They do so via use of a highly leveraged 
capital structure since equity holders will ignore the possible reduction in returns in the bad 
(bankruptcy) states, and only consider the probability of increased returns in the good states.  In 
bad states, debt holders suffer primarily since debt holders become the residual claimants to the 
firms’ assets (limited liability effect of debt financing)7.  Another suggested motive (predatory 
behavior or strategic bankruptcy effect) comes into effect when firms use leverage to vary output 
with the aim of driving rivals out of business8.   
 Brander and Lewis’ (1986 and 1988) study, in general, suggests that a firm’s capital 
structure will impact the firm’s business strategies or product market competition characteristics, 
such as pricing and/or output decisions.  However, since firms will anticipate the capital structure 
impact on their competitive behavior, they will therefore adjust their debt level appropriately.  In 
other words, the link between the firm’s capital structure and its product market is not a 
unilateral relationship, i.e. each variable may influence the other.  In addition, studies in this field 
provide support for this stance in asserting that firms in Bertrand or Cournot competition tend to 
have a certain level of debt9.  However, this debt level may also lead to the type of competitive 
strategy.   
 Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein (1988) developed a two-audience signaling model and 
explored a firm’s (informed party) choice of capital structure when the financing contract is 
observed by capital market and competing firm in the product market.  They assume an 
endogenous profit structure for the informed firm since the competitor’s action depends on the 
transaction it observes between the informed firm and the capital market.  They conclude with 
results that indicate that capital-market equilibrium is determined by the structure of the product 
market.  Their findings provide additional support for the need to analyze firm’s financial 
structure and product structure concurrently.   
                                                             
 
 
6
 Their model is similar to Jensen and Meckling (1976) in that an increase in debt encourages equity holders to 
follow riskier strategies. 
7
 e.g. Brander and Lewis (1986), Showalter (1995). 
8
 e.g.  Fudenberg and Tirole (1986); and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995) 
9
 Chevalier and Scharfstein (1994); Dasgupta and Titman (1998)  
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 Nevertheless, existing literature vis-à-vis the link between debt level and the nature of 
competition among firms focuses primarily on how capital structure influences firms competitive 
behavior with their rivals, and not how competition influences the strategic level of debt pursued 
by these firms.  In other words, it is presumed that firms’ first choose their debt level, then 
compete in the product market.  In most of the studies reviewed, motivated by either the limited 
liability effect of debt financing or the strategic bankruptcy effect, researchers have investigated 
the manner in which debt level has impacted firms’ business conduct or its competitive position.   
 Henceforth, based on prior literature, the following section 2.1 presents first, an overview 
of the research that deals with capital structure and strategic firm’s behavior. Then, in section 2.2 
we present an overview of the literature on market structure and its relationship with capital 
structure.       
 
2.1 Capital Structure and Firm’s Competitive Strategy 
 The literature in this subsection exploits the relationship between the firm’s capital 
structure and its strategy in the product market.  These models can be divided into three different 
theories; first, the limited liability effect; second, the predatory behavior (strategic bankruptcy); 
and third, the investment effect10.   
 
Limited Liability Effect:  
 Theoretical models investigating the relationship between capital structure and 
competition have been proposed by the various authors cited below.  Among them, Chevalier 
and Scharfstein (1994), as well as Dasgupta and Titman (1998) studies suggest that high debt, in 
general, leads to less aggressive competition, i.e. higher prices for Bertrand firms and lower 
output for Cournot firms.      
 While Brander and Lewis’ (1986) model predicts that Cournot firms subject to demand 
and/or cost uncertainty have an incentive to commit to a large output strategy using a high 
leverage structure.  On the other hand, Showalter (1995) argues that firms in Bertrand 
competition will only increase debt level when market demand is uncertain11, but not when costs 
are uncertain, since debt does not carry a strategic advantage in the latter case12.  Thus, when 
firms compete in Bertrand competition, they find an incentive to use debt only when demand 
conditions are uncertain, since in this case, an increase in the firm’s debt will cause both the 
firm’s and its rival’s price to increase.  This in turn causes, both the debt and equity value of the 
                                                             
 
 
10
 This strand of literature, investment effect, not directly examined in this paper shows how high debt levels may 
induce firms to either decrease or increases their investment level.  
11
 Increasing debt level, when demand is uncertain, would lead to an increase in industry prices as well as expected 
profit for the firm. 
12
 In the latter case, when costs are uncertain, leverage would triggers industry prices and expected firm profit would 
then decline. 
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firm to rise and consequently, firms take on debt in order to raise industry prices and expected 
profits.  Showalter’s (1999) empirical study of a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms shows that 
higher cost uncertainties induce Bertrand competitive sample of firms to reduce leverage while 
demand uncertainties led to an increase in the level of debt.  In other words, when rival firms 
compete primarily by setting prices: Bertrand strategy, the source of output market uncertainties 
will play a crucial role in determining firms’ optimal debt level.  Wanzenried’s (2003) findings 
support those of Showalter, however, asserts that this is the case for either Cournot or Bertrand 
firms.   
 Contrary to the findings of Showalter (1995) and Wanzenried (2003), Schuhmacher 
(2002) argues that exposed to uncertain demand, increasing the debt level, for either Cournot or 
Bertrand firms, would cause industry prices, as well as, expected profits to decrease.  When, on 
the other hand, firms are faced with uncertain costs, they do use high debt levels as leverage 
leads to an increase of expected firm’s profits.  The study contends that the Cournot model of 
quantity competition has to be interpreted as the reduced form of a more complex situation in 
which firms can commit to capacity levels before setting prices.  As such, capacity-price 
competitors choose their optimal strategic debt depending on the type of uncertainty that exists in 
the oligopoly market.  In addition, when demand is uncertain, firms do not take on debt, 
however, when cost is uncertain they assume high debt level strategies13.  
 Glazer (1994) stresses that the leverage impact on output quantity presented by Brander 
and Lewis (1986) is changed when the debts issued are long-term rather than short-term.  The 
study asserts that while short-term debts induce firms to behave aggressively, long-term debts do 
not have the same effect since the maturity date is so distant.  Campos (2000) corroborate this 
theory and found that firms with high levels of short-term debt always behaved more 
aggressively in the product markets, as indicated from Brander and Lewis (1986).  However, in 
firms with high levels of long-term debt, this effect was reduced.   
 
Predatory Behavior Model - Strategic Bankruptcy Effect: 
 Theoretical studies by Brander and Lewis (1988), Poitevin (1989b), Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) as well as Telser (1966) analyze the prospect that high debt may be a factor 
that leads firms to be more susceptible to going out of business resulting from competition with 
rivals.  In their model, unlevered, incumbent firms with access to capital have an incentive to 
increase quantity or reduce price in response to new entrant increase in leverage in order to force 
the leveraged firm out of the market.  
                                                             
 
 
13
 They explained that the key difference that’s driving the result is that in the capacity-price model increasing the 
demand parameter leads to a lower marginal profit to capacity.  This is because the market demand increases with 
the demand parameter, so that raising the capacity in the first stage, leads to stronger competition and lower prices in 
the second stage, and thus becomes less profitable.             
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 Maksimovic (1990) argues that firms gain strategic advantage when they can increase 
leverage using bank loan commitment at a fixed initial fee.  This is because, with loan 
commitments, they can credibly threaten to produce greater quantities than it otherwise would in 
response to the rival’s output decision.  As a result, firms do pursue increased leverage through 
bank loan commitments.  However, the increase in value created with loan commitment is 
eliminated when all firms gain access to bank loan commitments.   
Subramanian (1998) also contend that debt financing empowers firms to credibly commit 
to a larger output in the product market.  The message in their paper is that small levels of debt 
financing may be used to mimic an optimal contract and thus mitigate inefficiencies that arise in 
a monopolist’s relationship between a firm and its suppliers.  The effects of such an increase in 
leverage is Pareto optimal; a larger supplier base with non-negative earnings, increased firm 
value, and output quantity is increased resulting in lower prices, benefitting customers.   
 Poitevin (1990) contends that entrants, because they are at a financial disadvantage, wish 
to enter a market only when the incumbents have high costs.  Therefore, low-cost incumbents 
have an incentive to signal their cost to potential entrants with the aim of deterring their entry.  
Another advantage to offering this signal is that it also reveals information to financial markets 
that support gaining advantageous financial prices. In equilibrium, they find that for incumbent 
firms with low cost structure, attaining high leverage create an effective entry deterrent in the 
product market.   
 Ashiya (2000) asserts that less leveraged incumbent firms will deliberately chose to use 
predatory strategies against certain entrant firms.  In this strategy, the incumbent use these tactics 
against the strong entrant firms and not the weak firms with the explicit aim of keeping the 
market crowded; deflecting strong firms entry choices.    
 
2.2 Market Structure and Capital Structure 
 In contrast to the literature on capital structure and strategic behavior, where small levels 
of debt tend to make firms aggressive in the product markets; the research on capital and market 
structure reviewed below generally indicate a negative relationship between firm’s debt level and 
the degree of competition between firms in the market.  Studies by Opler and Titman (1994), 
Phillips (1995) and Chevalier (1995) document this proving that at larger levels, the effect of 
debts appears not to make firms aggressive, in general.  Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (2000) 
state that when firms are highly leveraged, they face difficulty in the financial market, as well as, 
in the product markets.   
 Opler and Titman (1994) studied the relationship between firm’s capital structure and 
market structure in industry downturns.  They maintain that during industry downturns, highly 
leveraged firms are the most vulnerable.  They find that highly leveraged firms suffer a loss of 
market share relative to less leveraged firms during industry downturns.  The firms in the top 
leverage deciles also experience a decline in the market value of their equities.  One of the three 
potential explanations for this finding is related to the predatory theory, or strategic bankruptcy 
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effect14.  They propose that unlevered firms may be exploiting industry downturns and engaging 
in predatory actions15 with the intent of driving rivals out of the market, making them lose 
market share.  As a result they argue that firms in concentrated market are less likely to carry 
significant debt.  This is because firms in such market are more likely to be faced with aggressive 
competitive tactics by rival firms attempting to gain market share.    
 Chevalier’s (1995) event study indicates that a leverage buyout announcement increases 
the market value of the leverage buyout chain’s local rivals, and encourages supermarket chains 
to enter and expand in the local market.  In other words, leverage was inversely related to 
product market competition; this is due to the leveraged firm financial vulnerability.  In a 
subsequent study, Chevalier (1995) finds evidence suggesting that leverage buyouts create an 
incentive for firms to raise prices in local markets where rivals of leveraged buyout firms are also 
highly leveraged.  Conversely, when rivals have low leverage and are more concentrated, the 
study finds that leverage buyouts lead to a decrease in prices.    
 Phillips (1995) examines how sudden increases in debt level impact the firm’s strategic 
decisions in terms of pricing and/or production.  The study concludes that, in general, debt level 
is positively related to product prices, but negatively related to output quantity.  Firms that 
increased their debt level experienced a decrease in sales.  However, in this same study, when the 
gypsum industry16 is analyzed instead, support is consistent with theoretical study of Brander and 
Lewis (1986).  They argue that highly leveraged firms have difficulty financing investment 
opportunities, because investors are unwilling to extend more funds due to their increased 
probability of default.  As a result, they are also more likely to result in bankruptcy leading to a 
more concentrated market structure.  They also show that following recapitalization, highly 
leveraged firms either lost market shares or failed to gain the shares of smaller rivals that exited 
the market.   
 Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (2000) reconcile the opposing views17 by introducing 
an additional variable i.e. firm’s supplier relations18 in the strategic interaction between a firm 
and its rivals.  They argue that increased leverage can be a strategic benefit in Cournot 
competition, when used to commit to a larger output since it is shown that an increase in a firm’s 
                                                             
 
 
14
 The other two potential suggestions were that 1) customers could simply be reducing business with highly 
leverage firms out of fear that leveraged firms will simply stop investing sufficient funds in product quality or 
reputation. Or 2) Leveraged firms are more inclined to efficiently downsize in response to a downturn. 
15
 Such actions maybe increase advertisings or price dumping.  
16
 The gypsum, the fibers glass insulation, the tractor-trailer and polyethylene industries were analyzed in this study.  
These industries were chosen on the basis of four criteria; 1) discrete increase of at least 25% in debt-to-market 
value by the firm with the largest sales, 2) limited number of producers in each industry with the top four firms 
comprising of at least 50% of the market, 3) product homogeneity within the industry and, 4) the leading firm 
producing at least 50% of its sales in the same 4 digit SIC code (Phillip, 1995). 
17
 Theoretical model like Brander and Lewis (1986) predicts that under imperfect competition, higher debt levels 
create a strategic advantage for firms competing in the product markets.  However, many empirical findings (Oplet 
and Titman (1994), Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995)) seem to indicate otherwise.     
18
 Firm’s supplier relation is a firm’s contractual relation with its suppliers. 
8 
 
output leads to a decrease in the rival’s output19.  However, this benefit can be detrimental if the 
resulting increase in output results in a decrease in input cost for all firms in the industry due to 
suppliers’ economies of scales.  In such a case, the firms’ leverage provides a benefit to the rival 
enabling them to increase output without the having to incur the cost of the debt.  They explain 
that when both firms, in a duopoly, increase their output, the industry output moves away from 
the monopoly level, and as a result, the industry profits are lowered.   
 Lyandres’ (2006) paper studied the link between firms’ degree of competitive interaction 
and their capital structure.  This study finds a positive relationship between firms’ leverage level 
and the extent of competitive interaction in these industries.  This is the case regardless of the 
competitive environment: Bertrand or Cournot.  
 In summary, the above literature review shows that the type of competitive behavior has 
continued to play a crucial role in studies of the relationship between competition and leverage.  
Therefore, we contribute to the literature by directly studying the debt level of Cournot firms 
against Bertrand firms in order to empirically test the intuitions if there are unique characteristics 
in these markets that create the incentive for differentiated debt levels.  Thus, one of the goals of 
our study is to explore the characteristics of leverage levels in each of these markets relative to 
one another.  Specifically, we do so by studying the relationship between the strength of 
competition in a given industry, the leverage of the firms in that industry along with the several 
other financial characteristics of these firms in a Cournot environment relative to a Bertrand 
environment. We speculate based on the various theories mentioned in the literature above that 
the relationship between competition and leverage may be different over different competitive 
environments. Namely, we zoom in onto the two environments: the Bertrand market and the 
Cournot market and test for differences in their capital and market structure. We also speculate 
that these relationships may also vary over industries and thus investigate these differences as 
well. We analyze the two-direction effect assumed between firm’s capital structure and its 
market structure (softness or toughness of product market competition) for both Bertrand and 
Cournot competition, as well as over differentiated industries.  We test for causality, i.e. we 
hypothesize that competition Granger causes leverage and leverage Granger causes competition. 
All our conjectures are tested using parametric and nonparametric tests.  
 The analysis is built on our ability to quantify competition for each industry and leverage 
for each firm. We test with 3 different metrics of competition and 4 different metrics of leverage. 
However, at each stage of the analysis, competition and leverage are defined unambiguously. So 
we will refer to them as variables Competition and Leverage. 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
19
 Supporting to Brander and Lewis (1986) theory. 
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3. Data, Variables, and Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Data Selection 
            We collect all U.S. firm financial information over the period of January 1, 1960 – June 
30, 2014 from Compustat.  We obtain the data at both annual and quarterly frequencies 
depending on data charactristics.  Firms’ competitors are defined as all firms in Compustat 
database with the same 4-digit SIC code in each year.  Observations without records of 4-digits 
historical SIC are to be removed from our sample.  The data set is composed of 1,531,515 
records, covering 33,631 firms in 448 industries. However, for many firms the financials area is 
available only for a few quarters and, therefore, we cannot use those firms for estimation of 
linear models with many predictors. This makes the effective sample size go down to anywhere 
between 400 and 4,000 firms depending on the exact model and statistical method. 
 
3.2 Measures of the competitive environment 
 We identify industry competitive behavior following two alternative techniques from 
Sundaram et al. (1996) and Kedia, 2006 methodology.  Sundaram et al., as well as Kedia’s, 
2006, approach constructs a proxy of competitive strategy measures to differentiate between 
firms that participate in Cournot vs. Bertrand competition.   
 Sundaram et al. (1996) assume that if two firms participate in a Cournot market, the 
effect of an exogenous shock on one firm will also impact the other firm’s marginal profit in the 
same manner.  However, if firms compete in Bertrand market, the effect of an exogenous shock 
that decreases marginal profit for one firm will increase the marginal profit of the other.   
 Therefore, they construct a proxy “competitive strategy measure (CSM)” for the nature of 
product market competition equal to the coefficient of correlation of the change in the firm’s 
profit margin (∆ in net income ÷ ∆ in net sales) with respect to the change in its competitors’ 
output.  
 
   ∆Π∆ , ∆ 
 
where Π is the change in firm’s profit between two consecutive years; 
∆  is the change in the firm’s sales between two consecutive years;  
and  ∆ is the change in the firm’s product rivals’ combined sales between two years.  The 
firm’s product rivals’ combined sale is defined as the combined annual sales of all other firms in 
the firm’s four digit SIC industry.   
 If the marginal profit decreases with an increase in output, i.e. the correlation coefficient 
is negative, then the firms are presumed to be competing in a Cournot market; if on the other 
10 
 
hand, the correlation coefficient is positive, firms are presumed to be competing in Bertrand 
market.   
 On the other hand, Kedia’s, 2006, methodology for the empirical assessment of the 
competitive environment “strategic interactions” between firms is derived from an estimation of 
the slope of firm’s reaction functions to changes in rival’s decisions.  Using quarterly data on 
profits and sales, strategic interactions, proxy as the slope of the reaction function is obtained by 
taking the total differential of the firms’ marginal profits.     
 The “strategic interaction measure” (SI) is documented as the t-statistic of β3Si + β4 in the 
following regression: 
 
∆ (∆Π1 / ∆S1) t= β0 + β1 * S1 * ∆S1 + β2 * ∆S1 + β3 * S1 * ∆S2 + β4 * ∆S2 + ε. 
 
 Where, ∆Π1 is the change is firm’s profit for firm i, and S1 is sales for firm i, ∆S1 is the 
change in sales for firm i, and ∆S2 is the change in sales for the rest of the industry.  Sales for the 
rest of the industry is defined as sales of all firms (except firm i), reported in the same four-digit 
SIC as firm i, in compustat. 
 In particular, if an estimate of (β3Si + β4) is statistically significant and negative the firm 
is presumed to be in the Cournot environment. If SI is statistically significant and positive the 
firm is presumed to be in the Bertrand environment.   
 We estimate the competitive strategy measure (CSM & SI) for each firm for every year to 
account for possible changes in competitive behavior over time. Firms, with CSM value less than 
zero, are classified Cournot (strategic substitutes) and firms with CSM values greater than zero 
are classified as Bertrand (strategic complements).  Firms with insignificant measure of 
competitive proxy are to be removed from the sample.  Similarly, we identify Cournot and 
Bertrand firms using SI measure and create dummy variables to identify Cournot or Bertrand 
environment.  We then obtain two samples of Bertrand and Cournot firms using CSM and SI 
measure.   
  
3.3 Measures of Leverage 
 The balance between debt and equity is the firms’ capital structure.   If the firm uses more 
debt than equity, it is said to be highly leveraged and vice versa.  We consider four alternative 
definitions of leverage, and compute the average leverage level for each firm as follows:  
  The book value of long-term debts defined as total long-term debt (Compustat item 9) 
divided by total assets (item 6);  
 
Book value of long-term debt =         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 The market value of long-term debt ratio defined as the average of total long-term debt 
divided by the average market value of total assets.  Market value of total assets is calculated as 
Total debt + Market value of equity + Preferred stock – Deferred taxes and investment credits = 
(item 9 + item 34 + (item 199*item54) + item 10 – item 35); 
 
Market value of long-term debt =              
 
 The book value of total debt ratio defined as total debt (which are long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities: item 9 + item 34) divided by total assets (item 6). 
 
Book value of total debt =        
 
 The market value of total debt ratio defined as total debt (which are long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities: item 9 + item 34) over market value of total assets.  Market value of 
total assets is calculated as Total debt + Market value of equity + Preferred stock – Deferred 
taxes and investment credits = (item 9 + item 34 + (item 199*item54) + item 10 – item 35); 
 
Market value of total debt =                  
 
 
3.4 Determinants of Leverage 
 Several factors have been documented as important in explaining a firm’s leverage 
choices.  Considering the static trade-off framework, firms are viewed as setting a target leverage 
ratio and moving towards it.  This leverage ratio is determined by considering the trade-off 
between the costs, such as bankruptcy costs and benefits, such as tax-benefits of debt.  We 
describe below some of these factors to be considered in this study which act as covariates in the 
simultaneous system of equations for Competition and Leverage. 
 Size:  Warner (1977) indicates that the cost of bankruptcy constitutes a smaller 
proportion of larger firms.  Therefore, firm size is a variable expected to be positively related to 
leverage.  In addition, larger firms are likely to provide better information to the market and 
therefore may benefit from better access to credit.  Firm size is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of average total assets. 
 Firm risk: Measured as the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation (item 13) divided by the total asset (item 6); firm risk, which indicates a higher 
degree of volatility of earnings and thus greater likelihood of bankruptcy, is expected to be 
negatively related to the leverage ratio of the firm (Bradley at al. (1984)). 
 Asset Tangibility: Lower risk for lenders, and reduced bankruptcy costs are assumed with 
higher asset tangibility.  Therefore, asset tangibility is expected to be positively related to 
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leverage.  We measure asset tangibility as the ratio of average net fixed assets (item 8) to average 
total assets (item 6).  
 Collateral: Frank and Goyal (2003) found that the measure of collateral is highly 
correlated with tangibility measure.  Lyandres (2006) explains that collateral reduces agency 
costs of debt and thus is expected to be positively correlated to the degree of leverage.  We will 
substitute, in our equation, measures of collateral and asset tangibility for robustness.  We 
measure collateral as the ratio of the sum of net fixed assets and inventories (item 8 + item 3) 
divided by total assets (item 6).   
 Liquidity: Measured as the ratio of average cash and short-term investment (item 1) to the 
average total assets (item 6) is also predicted to affect the level of leverage in firms.  This is 
predicted by the pecking-order theory of Myers (1984).   
 Profitability: The pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer to raise capital from 
retained earnings, primarily.  Secondarily, they will chose to raise capital by issuing debts; and as 
last resort, by issuing equity.  If so, we would expect that the more profitable firms are, the less 
likely they are to resort to debt financing.  Thus, we foresee a negative relation between 
profitability and leverage ratio.  We measure profitability as the ratio of operating income (item 
13) to total assets (item 6).   
 Mix of growth options and assets in place: Firms with high growth opportunities should 
be financing less debt than firms with few investment opportunities (Myers, 1977).  This is 
because agency conflicts between equity holders and debt holders arise from asset-substitution 
and underinvestment.  These conflicts can be partially mitigated by seeking more equity 
financing for projects instead of debt financing.  Therefore, we expect a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage.  We use market-to-book ratio, defined as the average 
market value of total assets (item 54*item 199 + item 9 + item 34) divided by the average book 
value of total assets (item 6), as a proxy for growth opportunities.  An alternative measurement 
proxy for the mix of investment opportunities and asset in place is the ratio of research and 
development expenditure (item 46) to sales (item 12) (Barclay et al. (2006)).  
 Dividends and repurchases: The more internal funds a firm has, the less incentive it has to 
use leverage according to the pecking order theory.  At the same time, firms with larger pools of 
internal funds are most likely to pay out dividends or repurchase stocks as an alternative way of 
distributing cash.  Therefore, firms that pay out dividends or repurchased shares in a given year 
are predicted to seek lower leverage levels.  
 Tax advantages of debt: Variables such as tax credits and investment tax credits can be 
considered as a tax shield substitute for debt, and as argued by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), 
since the associated tax advantage of debt decrease as such tax credit are increasing.  Therefore, 
we expect a negative relation between leverage and non-debt tax shields such as investment tax 
credits (item 208) and the ratio of depreciation (item 125).   
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3.5 Measure of Industry Concentration 
 We look at three measures of industry concentration.  All of them are defined on the 
industry-wide level.  In each industry, we calculate the level of concentration (CONC) as the 
sum of market shares of the four firms with the largest market shares in the main market of the 
firm20.  A second measure used in this study is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which infers 
competition from the degree of product market concentration (Campello, 2006); it is calculated 
as the summed, squared market shares of individual firms in the market in percentage form: HHI 
=∑ "#$%#&  .  Higher product market concentration is associated with lower competition and 
vice versa21.  A third measure used is a non-structural approach that derives the degree of 
competition from market behavior.  The Boone indicator by Boone, Griffith and Harrison (2005) 
measures the sensitivity of firms’ profits (or market shares) to their inefficiency in product 
markets.  It assumes that firm profits increase with efficiency and this increase is higher in more 
competitive industries.  The Boone indicator is measured by estimating the following regression: 
VROAit = α + βtlnMcij + εi,t  where VROA is calculated as sales revenue – cost of goods sold 
divided by its total assets.  lnMc is the natural log of cost of goods sold divided by sales revenue.  
The absolute value of the time-varying parameter '( measures the level of competition; thus BI = 
absolute value of '( .     
 
3.6 Determinants of Product Market Competition 
 Leverage level: As indicated in the literature review above, different streams of research 
dealing with the interaction between product market competition and the financial structure of 
companies (limited liability, predatory behavior, and investment effect) show an association 
between leverage level and product market competition.   
 Research and Development: Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) describe spending on research 
and development as an effective means of gaining a strategic advantage over competitors.  If 
firms were able to utilize R&D to reduce their cost; the reduction in cost would create a strategic 
advantage for them to lower price or increase quantity and potentially drive rivals out of 
business.  In this case, we would expect a positive relationship between R&D expense and 
product market completion measure (Campos, 2000).  Sometimes, however, concerns about the 
high cost and risk of duplicating efforts associated with R&D expense, may lead to firms 
choosing to cooperate instead of competing, thus leading to less aggressive and softer product 
                                                             
 
 
20
 The four - firm concentration ratio has been used in Opler & Titman (1994), Chevalier (1995a,b), Kovenock & 
Phillips (1997) and Campello (2003).  
21
 Demsetz (1973) note that high level of product market concentration can simply be the outcome of pronounced 
efficiency; as a result, higher concentration may not necessarily imply lower competition (Boone et al. (2005)).  We 
address this concern by estimating and alternating using the Boone indicator measure.  
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market competition.   R&D expenditure ratio is measured as R&D expenses divided by total 
sales.   
 Advertisement expense ratio: Spending on advertising is projected to have a positive 
correlation with the degree of competition in the product market.  Advertisement expense ratio is 
equal to advertisement expenses divided by sales. 
 Market Share: Davies and Geroski (1997) argue that market share is positively related to 
degree of concentration.  This is because if firms are not faced with significant level of 
competition, or if rivals have left the market causing the industry to become more concentrated, 
the remaining firms have more opportunities to gain market shares.  Market share is calculated 
for each firm as the annual sales of the firm divided total industry sales.   
  
3.7 Methodology 
 In this section we will state the model for the joint dynamics of competition and leverage, 
describe the statistical methods exploited for estimating the model and testing the variability of 
the parameters of the joint distribution of competition and leverage over different competitive 
environments and industries. 
 The model ties competition and leverage to one another as well as to several financial 
characteristics of the firms, which are described in the previous section. Competition and 
leverage are assumed to be endogenous.  The other variables are assumed to be exogenous.  The 
model states that, for each firm i and quarter t 
Competition
 it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it,. (1) 
Leverage
 it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility it + βL4 * 
Collateral
 it + βL5 * Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * 
Dividend
 it + βL9 * Tax Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * Size it + ζ it. (2) 
 In equation (1), residual ε
 it is correlated with predictor Leverage it.  Likewise, in equation 
(2), residual ζ
 it is correlated with predictor Competition it. For that reason, the ordinary least 
squares method is inappropriate for parameter estimation. It delivers an inconsistent estimate of 
regression coefficients βC0 - βL10. A well-established approach of correcting for the correlations 
is using instrumental variables, variables which are highly correlated with the predictors but 
uncorrelated with the residuals. We will use two-stage estimation for our analysis.  The method 
is as follows: 
 Regress Leverage
 it on Market Share it and obtain the fitted value LevHat it. Regress 
Competition
 it on the other predictors in equation (2) and obtain the fitted value CompHat it.  To 
estimate coefficients in equation (1), regress Competition
 it on LevHat it and Market Shareit. To 
estimate coefficients in equation (2), regress Leverage
 it on CompHat it and the exogenous 
predictors in equation (2). 
 In addition to estimating regression coefficients for Competition
 it and Leverage it, we 
calculate their pairwise correlations with respective predictors in equations (1) and (2).  
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 Next, we are interested in seeing whether the regression coefficients and correlations vary 
between the competitive environments.  To compare the competitive environments, we will use 
the independent-sample t-tests, since the estimates of the regression coefficients and correlations 
are a result of averaging many observations. Therefore, they are approximately normal due to the 
effect of the Central Limit Theorem. We use the t-test method allowing for unequal variances in 
the competitive environments. 
 To compare coefficients and correlations over different industries, we will run non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests since the Kruskal-Wallis test is less sensitive to the assumption 
of equal variance in all industry groups than the parametric ANOVA test.  
 The Kruskal-Wallis test is rank-based. The observations in all industry groups are 
combined and turned into ranks. Then the ranks of different groups are compared to one another 
to see if the discrepancy can be due to pure randomness.  As the result, the test is completely 
insensitive to outliers and to any distortions in the tails for some or all of the groups. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test compares the medians of the studied random variable over the industry 
groups. 
 As stated before, studies in this area has tended to suggest that the firm’s capital structure 
will impact the firms’ business strategies or product market competition characteristics and not 
how competition influences the strategic level of debt pursued by these firms.  In other words, it 
is presumed that firms first choose their debt level, and then compete in the product market.   
 However, since firms will anticipate the capital structure impact on their competitive 
behavior, they will therefore adjust their debt level appropriately.  Stated differently, the link 
between the firm’s capital structure and its product market competition is not a unilateral 
relationship, i.e. each variable may influence the other.   
 Therefore, we will run Granger tests to explore potential causality between competition 
and leverage.  For every firm i, we say that leverage Granger causes competition with lags m, p 
and q if coefficients βCp - βCq are jointly statistically significant according to an F-test in the 
following regression: 
Competition
 it = µC0 + αC1 * Competition i(t-1) + … + αCm * Competition i(t-m) + βCp * Leverage i(t-p) 
+ … + βCq * Leverage i(t-q) + γC1 * Market Share it + ε it.  (3) 
 Likewise, we say that competition Granger causes leverage with lags m, p and q if 
coefficients βLp – βLq are jointly statistically significant according to an F-test in the following 
regression: 
Leverage
 it = µL0 + αL1 * Leverage i(t-1) + … + αLm * Leverage i(t-m) + βLp * Competition i(t-p) + … + 
βLq * Competition i(t-q) + γL1 * Risk it + γL2 * Asset Tangibility it + γL3 * Collateral it + γL4 * 
Liquidity
 it + γL5 * Profitability it + γL6 * Growth Options and Assets it + γL7 * Dividend it + γL8 * 
Tax
 it Advantages of Debt it + γL9 * Size it+ ζ it.  (4) 
 We use the following settings: m = 2, p = 1, q = 2 and the significance level equal to 
10%. We end up with a p-value for each firm and aggregate the p-values to make one 
conclusion.  Under the null hypothesis, the lags of Leverage have zero influence on Competition. 
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This means that each p-value is a random variable distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. If, however, 
the lags of leverage have non-zero influence on competition the p-values will concentrate close 
to 0. Their distribution will be tilted from 1 to 0.  
 Therefore we will test whether the sample distribution of the p-values is uniform on [0, 1] 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test and report its p-value as the aggregate p-value 
of Granger causality test. We will do the same as well in checking the causality in the opposite 
direction: from competition to leverage.   
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4. Results 
 
 
 In what follows, we will address our results one by one.  In general, most of our 
conclusions are the same uniformly over different definitions of competition and leverage which 
adds extra robustness and validity to the analysis.  We present the results for the regression 
coefficients and correlations separately. 
 
4.1. Differences of the joint dynamics of competition and leverage 
We, first estimate equations (1) and (2), and then estimate the pairwise correlations between the 
dependent variable and predictors in each equation. These correlations present a separate set of 
metrics characterizing the joint distribution of all the financial factors involved.  We will review 
the variation of these metrics (regression coefficients) between the two competitive 
environments, as well as the variation of the correlation coefficients.   
 
4.1.1. Tests for regression coefficients 
 Tables 1 and 2 are compiled of p-values characterizing the difference of the regression 
coefficients between the Bertrand and Cournot environments when those are defined according 
to the CSM scheme. Table 1 refers to equation (1) and table 2 refers to equation (2). The p-
values correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances.  We will 
comment on each table separately in the following. 
 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here 
 
 Tables 1 and 2 show the results with the various definitions of Competition and 
Leverage.  In Table 1, competition, when defined as the level of concentration (CONC), shows 
significant sensitivity to leverage ratio in the form of market value of long-term debt (MVLD).  
In addition the degree of competition, when defined by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), 
also exhibits significant sensitivity to the leverage ratio measured as the book value of long-term 
debt (MVLD).  However, the results from equation 1, illustrate that in most cases the p-values of 
the t-tests are higher than the significance level of 5% to 10%.  In regards to equation 2, it is 
shown that the degree of leverage is sensitive to the competitive environment only when leverage 
is measured using the book value of long term debt (BVLD) method and competition is 
measured using the Boone indicator.  Leverage also shows sensitivity to other control variables 
as shown in Table 2.  Despite this apparent connection in the cases mentioned above, the lack of 
sensitivity on the majority of combinations implies that there is not enough evidence to claim 
that the sensitivities of competition to leverage and market share, or the sensitivities of leverage 
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to competition and other covariates, in the joint model are different between the two competitive 
environments when this environment is defined by the CSM measure.   
 Next, we proceed to looking at the difference of the regression coefficients between the 
two environments when those are defined according to the SI scheme. Table 3 refers to equation 
(1) and table 4 refers to equation (2).  
 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here 
 
 Studying the resulting p-values of t-tests comparing the regression coefficients in the 
“Leverage” and the “Competition” equation between the Bertrand and Cournot environments as 
defined by the SI measure show that similarly to the CSM definition, over different definitions of 
Competition and Leverage, the p-values of the t-tests continue to be much higher than the 
significance level of 10%. This is the case in all but one scenario in equation 1, which is when 
leverage is measured using BVLD, and competition is measured using the CONC method.  This 
implies that there is not enough evidence to claim that the sensitivities of competition to leverage 
and market share, and the sensitivities of leverage to competition and other covariates in the joint 
model are different between the two competitive environments when those are defined according 
to the SI scheme either. The occasional p-values below 10% could easily be a consequence of 
type I errors as this may happen every 20th time even if the null hypothesis is true and there is 
absolutely no difference between the Bertrand and Cournot environments. 
 
4.1.2. Test for Correlations 
 Correlation tests under both CSM and SI framework deliver very similar results to those 
for regression coefficients.  For each correlation test, the number of firms in the Bertrand and 
Cournot groups is the same as the number of Bertrand and Cournot firms for the test on the 
corresponding regression coefficient. 
 Starting with the CSM framework, tables 5 and 6 below are compiled of p-values 
characterizing the difference of the pairwise correlations between the Bertrand and Cournot 
environments. Table 5 refers to equation (1) and table 6 refers to equation (2). The p-values 
correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances. 
 
Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here 
 
 Resulting p-values of t-tests comparing the correlations of competition and its candidate 
predictors between the Bertrand and Cournot environments as defined by the CSM imply that 
there is not enough evidence to claim that the marginal sensitivities of competition to leverage 
and market share are different between the two competitive environments.   In addition, table 6 
also shows that over different definitions of competition and leverage, the p-values of the t-tests 
are higher than the significance level of 10%.  This implies that there is not enough evidence to 
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claim that the marginal sensitivities of leverage to competition and other covariates are different 
between the two competitive environments.  The results are remarkably similar for different 
covariates.  
 Next we look into the SI framework. Table 7 refers to equation (1) and table 8 refers to 
equation (2).  Contrary to our CSM-based conclusions, our SI-based results characterizing the 
differences of pairwise correlation between Bertrand and Cournot, show consistent sensitivity for 
the CONC and HHI competition measures to the BVLD and BVTD leverage measures.  Over 
these four combinations of Competition and Leverage (CONC&BVLD, CONC&BVTD, 
HHI&BVLD, HHI&BVTD), the p-values of the t-tests are significant at levels of 10% or lower, 
implying that the marginal sensitivities of competition to leverage and market share are different 
between the two competitive environments.   
 
Insert Table 7 and Table 8 here 
 
 
4.2. Differences of the joint dynamics of competition and leverage over 
industries. 
 As explained in the methodology section, we choose to study the industry effects via 
Kruskal-Wallis tests. But this is not the biggest difference with the previous section. Most 
importantly here is we no longer classify firms into Bertrand and Cournot categories.  In the 
reported tables below, statistical significance estimates are obvious.  The industry effects are 
significant. 
 
4.2.1. Test for regression coefficients 
 Tables 9 and 10 below are compiled of p-values characterizing the difference of the 
regression coefficients between the industries. Table 9 refers to equation (1) and table 10 refers 
to equation (2). The p-values correspond to Kruskal-Wallis tests.  
  
Insert Table 9 and Table 10 here 
 
 Inferences from the p-values of Kruskal-Wallis tests comparing the regression 
coefficients in the “Competition” or “Leverage” equation between the industries confirm that 
over different definitions of competition and leverage, the sensitivity of competition to market 
share in the joint model is different in different industries. For half of combinations of definitions 
of competition and leverage, the sensitivity of competition to leverage in the joint model is 
different in different industries. For the other half, the sensitivity is the same over different 
industries. Choosing the metrics for competition and leverage seems to matter.  Different 
definitions of competition and leverage do not agree perfectly, however, in general there is 
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enough evidence to claim that the sensitivity of leverage to risk, liquidity, profitability, growth 
options and assets and size in the joint model is different in different industries. 
 While, there is not enough evidence to claim that the sensitivity of leverage to 
competition, asset tangibility, collateral, dividend and tax advantages of debt in the joint model is 
different in different industries.  
 
4.2.2. Test for correlations 
 Tables 11 and 12 below are compiled of p-values characterizing the difference of the 
correlations between the industries. Table 11 refers to equation (1) and table 12 refers to equation 
(2). The p-values correspond to Kruskal-Wallis tests comparing the correlations of Competition 
and its candidate predictors, and sequentially comparing the correlations of Leverage and its 
candidate predictors between the industries.   
 
Insert Table 11 and Table 12 here 
 
 Our results attest that over different definitions of competition and leverage, the marginal 
sensitivities of competition to leverage and market shares, as well as the marginal sensitivities of 
leverage to competition and other covariates are different in different industries. 
 
4.3. Granger Causality Tests 
 Finally, we get to test the causality in both directions between competition and leverage. 
As explained in the methodology section, we do that separately for each firm and then aggregate 
the results using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure. This way we have only one p-value for 
each definition of competition and leverage. See Table 13 below. 
 
Insert Table 13 here 
 
 Table 13 shows p-values of aggregate Granger causality tests.  For each firm the 
maximum lag is 2. The p-values have been aggregated over firms using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test.  Consistently, we find that over different definitions of Competition and Leverage, 
the aggregate p-values of the Granger tests are much lower than the significance level of 10%.  
This is the case for both directions: the influence of leverage on competition and the influence of 
competition on leverage. The results definitively state that leverage causes competition and 
competition causes leverage. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
 This study first strived to confirm the assumption of differentiated debt levels between 
firms operating in Cournot versus Bertrand markets.  Our results, however, indicate that there is 
no difference in the relative debt levels between the two competitive environments when using 
the CSM measure.  Some differences are observed in the correlation of competition and leverage 
between Bertrand and Cournot firms when the samples are partitioned using the SI measure.  
However, these relationships are not maintained throughout the study with neither the CSM 
measure, nor independent sample t-test of the correlation using either CSM or SI measure.   
 The study then proceeds with conducting Kruskal-Wallis tests, to characterize differences 
in the coefficients, as well as the correlation, of competition and leverage over different 
industries.  Results from the study confirm that the joint distribution of competition and leverage 
is different in different industries. The partial sensitivities of competition and leverage to half of 
financial factors in the study are different in different industries.  The marginal sensitivities of 
competition and leverage to all factors in the study are different in different industries. 
 Over all industries and firms in our sample, we find that leverage Granger causes 
competition and competition Granger causes leverage.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1: DIFFERENCES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS 
(CSM) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (1) Competition
 it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it, with two-stage 
estimation, and testing the research hypothesis that the average debt level of firms relative to their industry concentration is different in Cournot versus 
Bertrand market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  
p-values presented correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances comparing the regression coefficients of leverage proxies 
in the “Competition” equation for a sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the CSM measure.  N represents the split 
between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is determined by the CSM measure. 
 
Competitive strategy measure (CSM) for the nature of product market competition equal to the coefficient of correlation of the change in the firm’s 
profit margin (∆ in net income ÷ ∆ in net sales) with respect to the change in its competitors’ output.    )∆*+,∆*, , ∆- where Π is the change in 
firm’s profit between two consecutive years, ∆is the change in the firm’s, and  ∆is the change in the firm’s product rivals’ combined sales between 
two years.  If the marginal profit decreases with an increase in output, i.e. the correlation coefficient is negative, then the firms are presumed to be 
competing in a Cournot market; if on the other hand, the correlation coefficient is positive, firms are presumed to be competing in Bertrand market.   
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Market Share is a control variable in the “Competition” equation (see section 3.5) 
  CONC HHI BOONE 
  
BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage 0.103 0.018* 0.348 0.303 0.016* 0.134 0.134 0.220 0.125 0.412 0.337 0.332 
Market Share 0.117 0.180 0.237 0.220 0.135 0.126 0.234 0.187 0.967 0.584 0.735 0.693 
Constant 0.289 0.379 0.384 0.298 0.971 0.868 0.966 0.888 0.879 0.325 0.489 0.206 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 158/198 160/201 156/191 152/186 158/198 160/201 155/191 152/186 136/162 138/163 133/152 130/149 
* denotes statistical significance level  10% or lower 
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Table 2:DIFFERENCES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS(CSM) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (2) Leverage it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility it + βL4 * 
Collateral it + βL5 * Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * Dividend it + βL9 * Tax Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * 
Size it + ζ it., with two-stage estimation, and testing the research hypothesis that the industry concentration level relative to the firms leverage level is different in 
Cournot versus Bertrand market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as 
indicated.  p-values presented correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances comparing the regression coefficients of competition 
proxies in the “Leverage” equation for a sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the CSM measure. N represents the split 
between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is determined by the CSM measure. 
 
Competitive strategy measure (CSM) for the nature of product market competition equal to the coefficient of correlation of the change in the firm’s profit margin 
(∆ in net income ÷ ∆ in net sales) with respect to the change in its competitors’ output.    )∆*+,∆*, , ∆- where Π is the change in firm’s profit between two 
consecutive years, ∆is the change in the firm’s, and  ∆is the change in the firm’s product rivals’ combined sales between two years.  If the marginal profit 
decreases with an increase in output, i.e. the correlation coefficient is negative, then the firms are presumed to be competing in a Cournot market; if on the other 
hand, the correlation coefficient is positive, firms are presumed to be competing in Bertrand market.   
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Risk, Asset Tangibility, Collateral, Liquidity, Profitability, Growth Options and Assets, Dividend, Tax Adv of Debt, Size are all control variables of the leverage 
equation (see section 3.4) 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Competition 0.160 0.573 0.382 0.747 0.604 0.235 0.361 0.287 0.042* 0.776 0.750 0.572 
Risk 0.601 0.252 0.462 0.091* 0.545 0.160 0.638 0.325 0.844 0.255 0.218 0.057* 
Asset Tangibility 0.499 0.957 0.381 0.168 0.335 0.121 0.401 0.250 0.231 0.355 0.090* 0.120 
Collateral 0.271 0.707 0.296 0.776 0.516 0.322 0.083* 0.188 0.616 0.621 0.918 0.567 
Liquidity 0.164 0.130 0.563 0.199 0.197 0.180 0.184 0.191 0.146 0.321 0.581 0.576 
Profitability 0.487 0.228 0.448 0.623 0.595 0.361 0.840 0.149 0.115 0.677 0.047* 0.165 
Growth Options  0.421 0.603 0.430 0.656 0.215 0.363 0.218 0.675 0.640 0.545 0.685 0.528 
Dividend 0.241 0.270 0.321 0.948 0.515 0.568 0.245 0.066* 0.499 0.753 0.457 0.504 
Tax Adv of Debt 0.341 0.902 0.281 0.503 0.240 0.728 0.867 0.373 0.769 0.199 0.189 0.587 
Size 0.532 0.665 0.604 0.429 0.053* 0.335 0.378 0.563 0.150 0.436 0.067* 0.368 
Intercept 0.117 0.557 0.281 0.685 0.561 0.508 0.824 0.893 0.094 0.390 0.089 0.304 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 155/190 156/191 150/182 147/177 161/199 162/201 156/191 153/186 139/162 140/163 134/152 131/149 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower 
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Table 3: DIFFERENCES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS (SI) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (1) Competition
 it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it, with two-stage estimation, and 
testing the research hypothesis that the average debt level of firms relative to their industry concentration is different in Cournot versus Bertrand market.  
Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  p-values presented correspond 
to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances comparing the regression coefficients of leverage proxies in the “Competition” equation for a 
sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the SI measure.  N represents the split between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is 
determined by the SI measure. 
 
Strategic interaction measure (SI) is documented as the t-stat of β3Si + β4 in the regression: ∆ (∆Π1 / ∆S1) t= β0 + β1 * S1 * ∆S1 + β2 * ∆S1 + β3 * S1 * ∆S2 + β4 * 
∆S2 + ε. Where, ∆Π1 is the change is firm’s profit for firm i, and S1 is sales for firm i, ∆S1 is the change in sales for firm i, and ∆S2 is the change in sales for the 
rest of the industry.  In particular, if an estimate of (β3Si + β4) is statistically significant and negative the firm is presumed to be in the Cournot environment. If SI 
is statistically significant and positive the firm is presumed to be in the Bertrand environment. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Market Share is a control variable in the “Competition” equation (see section 3.5) 
  
CONC HHI BOONE 
  
BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage 0.096* 0.132 0.282 0.488 0.266 0.486 0.727 0.275 0.948 0.952 0.663 0.846 
Market Share 0.813 0.793 0.975 0.798 0.909 0.962 0.844 0.969 0.929 0.899 0.834 0.951 
Constant 0.448 0.087 0.151 0.045 0.347 0.146 0.142 0.051 0.165 0.624 0.103 0.381 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 111/86 112/86 106/81 104/80 111/86 112/86 106/81 104/80 94/72 94/72 90/66 88/66 
* denotes statistical significance level  10% or lower 
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Table 4: DIFFERENCES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO 
ENVIRONMENTS (SI) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (2) Leverage it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility 
it + βL4 * Collateral it + βL5 * Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * Dividend it + βL9 * Tax 
Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * Size it + ζ it., with two-stage estimation, and testing the research hypothesis that the industry concentration level 
relative to the firms leverage level is different in Cournot versus Bertrand market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each 
regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  p-values presented correspond to independent sample t-tests 
allowing for unequal variances comparing the regression coefficients of competition proxies in the “Leverage” equation for a sample of Bertrand 
and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the SI measure.  N represents the split between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is 
determined by the SI measure. 
 
Strategic interaction measure (SI) is documented as the t-stat of β3Si + β4 in the regression: ∆ (∆Π1 / ∆S1) t= β0 + β1 * S1 * ∆S1 + β2 * ∆S1 + β3 * 
S1 * ∆S2 + β4 * ∆S2 + ε. Where, ∆Π1 is the change is firm’s profit for firm i, and S1 is sales for firm i, ∆S1 is the change in sales for firm i, and 
∆S2 is the change in sales for the rest of the industry.  In particular, if an estimate of (β3Si + β4) is statistically significant and negative the firm is 
presumed to be in the Cournot environment. If SI is statistically significant and positive the firm is presumed to be in the Bertrand environment. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Risk, Asset Tangibility, Collateral, Liquidity, Profitability, Growth Options and Assets, Dividend, Tax Adv of Debt, Size are all control variables 
of the leverage equation (see section 3.4) 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Competition 0.197 0.138 0.335 0.124 0.293 0.211 0.278 0.269 0.379 0.221 0.881 0.994 
Risk 0.12 0.363 0.286 0.71 0.284 0.151 0.034* 0.222 0.35 0.897 0.214 0.233 
Asset Tangibility 0.237 0.162 0.372 0.105 0.352 0.471 0.684 0.586 0.311 0.804 0.154 0.346 
Collateral 0.291 0.046* 0.466 0.096* 0.276 0.171 0.486 0.387 0.476 0.362 0.356 0.875 
Liquidity 0.552 0.612 0.137 0.097* 0.548 0.32 0.036* 0.028* 0.875 0.596 0.789 0.561 
Profitability 0.073* 0.355 0.05* 0.362 0.154 0.667 0.196 0.734 0.161 0.462 0.316 0.769 
Growth Options and Assets 0.076* 0.788 0.072* 0.099* 0.208 0.469 0.548 0.482 0.072* 0.346 0.17 0.209 
Dividend 0.299 0.02* 0.219 0.535 0.273 0.752 0.231 0.537 0.325 0.047* 0.236 0.076* 
Tax Adv of Debt 0.282 0.553 0.282 0.957 0.95 0.751 0.588 0.097* 0.197 0.202 0.448 0.36 
Size 0.486 0.358 0.216 0.159 0.8 0.444 0.323 0.313 0.77 0.334 0.514 0.447 
Intercept 0.134 0.135 0.209 0.131 0.271 0.352 0.334 0.404 0.411 0.581 0.757 0.506 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 108/83 108/83 102/78 100/77 112/87 113/87 106/82 104/81 95/73 95/73 90/67 88/67 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower 
 
28 
 
 
Table 5: DIFFERENCES IN THE CORRELATION OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS 
(CSM) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (1) Competition it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it, with two-stage 
estimation, and testing the research hypothesis that the correlation of debt level of firms relative to their industry concentration is different in Cournot 
versus Bertrand market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as 
indicated.  p-values presented correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances characterizing the difference of the pairwise 
correlations of leverage  and competition for a sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the CSM measure.  N represents 
the split between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is determined by the CSM measure. 
 
Competitive strategy measure (CSM) for the nature of product market competition equal to the coefficient of correlation of the change in the firm’s 
profit margin (∆ in net income ÷ ∆ in net sales) with respect to the change in its competitors’ output.    )∆*+,∆*, , ∆- where Π is the change in 
firm’s profit between two consecutive years, ∆is the change in the firm’s, and  ∆is the change in the firm’s product rivals’ combined sales between 
two years.  If the marginal profit decreases with an increase in output, i.e. the correlation coefficient is negative, then the firms are presumed to be 
competing in a Cournot market; if on the other hand, the correlation coefficient is positive, firms are presumed to be competing in Bertrand market.   
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Market Share is a control variable in the “Competition” equation (see section 3.5) 
 
CONC HHI BOONE 
 
BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage 0.815 0.715 0.913 0.969 0.279 0.247 0.324 0.230 0.855 0.741 0.488 0.462 
Market Share 0.585 0.640 0.730 0.756 0.335 0.440 0.395 0.362 0.199 0.187 0.298 0.243 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 159/199 160/201 156/191 152/186 159/199 160/201 156/191 152/186 137/162 138/163 134/152 131/149 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower 
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Table 6: DIFFERENCES IN THE CORRELATION OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS (CSM) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (2) Leverage it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility it + βL4 * 
Collateral it + βL5 * Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * Dividend it + βL9 * Tax Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * 
Size it + ζ it., with two-stage estimation, and testing the research hypothesis that the correlation between the industry concentration level relative to the firms 
leverage level is different in Cournot versus Bertrand market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the 
various combinations as indicated.  p-values presented correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances characterizing the difference in 
the pairwise correlations of competition and leverage for a sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the CSM measure.  N 
represents the split between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is determined by the CSM measure. 
 
Competitive strategy measure (CSM) for the nature of product market competition equal to the coefficient of correlation of the change in the firm’s profit margin 
(∆ in net income ÷ ∆ in net sales) with respect to the change in its competitors’ output.    )∆*+,∆*, , ∆- where Π is the change in firm’s profit between 
two consecutive years, ∆is the change in the firm’s, and  ∆is the change in the firm’s product rivals’ combined sales between two years.  If the marginal profit 
decreases with an increase in output, i.e. the correlation coefficient is negative, then the firms are presumed to be competing in a Cournot market; if on the other 
hand, the correlation coefficient is positive, firms are presumed to be competing in Bertrand market.   
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Risk, Asset Tangibility, Collateral, Liquidity, Profitability, Growth Options and Assets, Dividend, Tax Adv of Debt, Size are all control variables of the leverage 
equation (see section 3.4) 
 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD 
Competition 0.815 0.715 0.913 0.969 0.279 0.247 0.324 0.230 0.855 0.741 0.488 
Risk 0.479 0.692 0.288 0.315 0.479 0.692 0.288 0.315 0.735 0.980 0.698 
Asset Tangibility 0.118 0.167 0.092* 0.155 0.118 0.167 0.092* 0.155 0.161 0.375 0.064* 
Collateral 0.053* 0.079* 0.108 0.067* 0.053* 0.079* 0.108 0.067* 0.126 0.263 0.131 
Liquidity 0.151 0.187 0.669 0.233 0.151 0.187 0.669 0.233 0.195 0.325 0.700 
Profitability 0.304 0.189 0.252 0.409 0.304 0.189 0.252 0.409 0.644 0.349 0.254 
Growth Options and Assets 0.400 0.448 0.334 0.184 0.400 0.448 0.334 0.184 0.159 0.475 0.138 
Dividend 0.903 0.951 0.976 0.413 0.903 0.951 0.976 0.413 0.676 0.822 0.799 
Tax Adv of Debt 0.555 0.372 0.371 0.147 0.555 0.372 0.371 0.147 0.589 0.575 0.772 
Size 0.238 0.065* 0.139 0.031* 0.238 0.065* 0.139 0.031* 0.503 0.344 0.547 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 160/201 156/191 152/186 159/199 160/201 156/191 152/186 137/162 138/163 134/152 131/149 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower 
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Table 7: DIFFERENCES IN THE CORRELATION OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS (SI) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (1) Competition it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it, with two-stage estimation, 
and testing the research hypothesis that the correlation of debt level of firms relative to their industry concentration is different in Cournot versus Bertrand 
market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  p-values presented 
correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances characterizing the difference of the pairwise correlations of leverage  and competition 
for a sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the SI measure.  N represents the split between Bertrand and Cournot firms which 
is determined by the SI measure. 
 
Strategic interaction measure (SI) is documented as the t-stat of β3Si + β4 in regression: ∆ (∆Π1 / ∆S1) t= β0 + β1 * S1 * ∆S1 + β2 * ∆S1 + β3 * S1 * ∆S2 + β4 * ∆S2 + 
ε. Where, ∆Π1 is the change is firm’s profit for firm i, and S1 is sales for firm i, ∆S1 is the change in sales for firm i, and ∆S2 is the change in sales for the rest of 
the industry.  In particular, if an estimate of (β3Si + β4) is statistically significant and negative the firm is presumed to be in the Cournot environment. If SI is 
statistically significant and positive the firm is presumed to be in the Bertrand environment. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Market Share is a control variable in the “Competition” equation (see section 3.5) 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage 0.073* 0.532 0.049* 0.267 0.043 0.935 0.061* 0.302 0.661 0.861 0.581 0.726 
Market Share 0.108 0.104 0.08* 0.077* 0.034* 0.03* 0.025* 0.035* 0.283 0.283 0.155 0.227 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 111/86 112/86 106/82 104/80 111/86 112/86 106/82 104/80 94/72 94/72 90/67 88/66 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower 
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Table 8: DIFFERENCES IN THE CORRELATION  OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE BETWEEN THE TWO ENVIRONMENTS (SI) 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (2) Leverage it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility it + βL4 * 
Collateral it + βL5 * Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * Dividend it + βL9 * Tax Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * 
Size it + ζ it., with two-stage estimation, and testing the research hypothesis that the correlation between the industry concentration level relative to the firms 
leverage level is different in Cournot versus Bertrand market.  Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the 
various combinations as indicated.  p-values presented correspond to independent sample t-tests allowing for unequal variances characterizing the difference in 
the pairwise correlations of competition and leverage for a sample of Bertrand and Cournot firms, with the environment defined by the SI measure.  N represents 
the split between Bertrand and Cournot firms which is determined by the SI measure. 
 
Strategic interaction measure (SI) is documented as the t-stat of β3Si + β4 in regression: ∆ (∆Π1 / ∆S1) t= β0 + β1 * S1 * ∆S1 + β2 * ∆S1 + β3 * S1 * ∆S2 + β4 * ∆S2 + 
ε. Where, ∆Π1 is the change is firm’s profit for firm i, and S1 is sales for firm i, ∆S1 is the change in sales for firm i, and ∆S2 is the change in sales for the rest of 
the industry.  In particular, if an estimate of (β3Si + β4) is statistically significant and negative the firm is presumed to be in the Cournot environment. If SI is 
statistically significant and positive the firm is presumed to be in the Bertrand environment. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Risk, Asset Tangibility, Collateral, Liquidity, Profitability, Growth Options and Assets, Dividend, Tax Adv of Debt, Size are all control variables of the leverage 
equation (see section 3.4) 
  CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Competition 0.073* 0.532 0.049* 0.267 0.043* 0.935 0.061* 0.302 0.661 0.861 0.581 0.726 
Risk 0.159 0.325 0.148 0.195 0.159 0.325 0.148 0.195 0.37 0.487 0.186 0.303 
Asset Tangibility 0.718 0.953 0.983 0.954 0.718 0.953 0.983 0.954 0.301 0.47 0.491 0.519 
Collateral 0.954 0.986 0.773 0.841 0.954 0.986 0.773 0.841 0.823 0.723 0.987 0.762 
Liquidity 0.864 0.693 0.901 0.9 0.864 0.693 0.901 0.9 0.892 0.72 0.519 0.66 
Profitability 0.697 0.643 0.718 0.715 0.697 0.643 0.718 0.715 0.813 0.601 0.688 0.882 
Growth Options and Assets 0.19 0.602 0.049* 0.363 0.19 0.602 0.049* 0.363 0.26 0.319 0.054* 0.109 
Dividend 0.255 0.779 0.54 0.745 0.255 0.779 0.54 0.745 0.493 0.77 0.929 0.932 
Tax Adv of Debt 0.788 0.558 0.796 0.193 0.788 0.558 0.796 0.193 0.865 0.562 0.749 0.22 
Size 0.798 0.916 0.861 0.532 0.798 0.916 0.861 0.532 0.879 0.766 0.816 0.56 
N (Bertrand/Cournot) 111/86 112/86 106/82 104/80 111/86 112/86 106/82 104/80 94/72 94/72 90/67 88/66 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower, <0.01 denotes statistical significance level 1% or lower 
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Table 9: DIFFERENCES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE OVER INDUSTRIES 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (1) Competition it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it, with two-stage estimation, and 
testing for the differences in the correlation of debt level of firms relative to their industry concentration over different industries.   
Competition and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  P-values presented correspond to 
Kruskal-Wallis test and characterize the difference in leverage coefficient relative to the industry competition level over the different industries.  N represents the split 
between firms and industries sample used in test. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Market Share is a control variable in the “Competition” equation (see section 3.5) 
 CONC HHI BOONE 
 
BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage 0.994 0.995 0.917 0.507 0.064* 0.178 0.023* <0.01 0.035* 0.028* 0.001* 0.093* 
Market Share <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.037* 0.010* 0.024* 0.027* 
Constant <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
N (firms/Industries) 4170/372 4206/373 4052/368 4000/368 4170/372 4206/373 4052/368 4000/368 4170/372 4206/373 4052/368 4000/368 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower, <0.01 denotes statistical significance level 1% or lower 
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Table 10: DIFFERENCES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE OVER INDUSTRIES 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (2) Leverage it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility it + βL4 * Collateral it + βL5 * 
Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * Dividend it + βL9 * Tax Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * Size it + ζ it., with two-stage 
estimation, and testing for the differences in the correlation of debt level of firms relative to their industry concentration over different industries.  Competition and leverage 
measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  P-values presented correspond to Kruskal-Wallis test and characterize 
the difference in the competition coefficient relative to the firm’s leverage level over the different industries. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Risk, Asset Tangibility, Collateral, Liquidity, Profitability, Growth Options and Assets, Dividend, Tax Adv of Debt, Size are all control variables of the leverage equation (see 
section 3.4) 
 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Competition 0.035* <0.01 0.111 <0.01 0.995 0.994 0.998 0.768 0.726 0.649 0.278 0.844 
Risk 0.006* 0.004* 0.004* 0.002* 0.137 0.024* 0.015* 0.06* 0.01* <0.01 0.004* <0.01 
Asset Tangibility 0.179 0.07* 0.492 0.027* 0.018* <0.01 0.074* 0.117 0.178 0.02* 0.443 0.21 
Collateral 0.017* 0.073* 0.016* 0.034* 0.08* 0.875 0.299 0.025* 0.24 0.105 0.25 0.076* 
Liquidity 0.199 0.043* 0.044* 0.031* 0.002* 0.006* 0.001* 0.001* 0.417 0.006* 0.547 0.021* 
Profitability 0.001* 0.117 0.015* <0.01 0.162 0.062* 0.017* <0.01 0.042* 0.325 0.201 <0.01 
Growth Options and Assets 0.03* <0.01 0.001* <0.01 0.005* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.014* <0.01 0.001* <0.01 
Dividend 0.264 0.057* 0.241 0.139 0.04* 0.065* 0.791 0.047* 0.913 0.18 0.88 0.327 
Tax Adv of Debt 0.734 0.504 0.459 0.008* 0.263 0.366 0.418 0.035* 0.834 0.769 0.56 0.037* 
Size 0.043* 0.011* 0.059* 0.027* 0.057* 0.088* 0.066* 0.005* 0.127 0.076* 0.044* 0.032* 
Intercept 0.023* <0.01 0.097* 0.004* 0.256 <0.01 0.207 <0.01 0.588 0.001* 0.022* <0.01 
N (firms/Industries) 4046/372 4068/373 3902/368 3855/368 4222/372 4245/373 4071/368 4019/368 3688/313 3712/314 3538/306 3496/306 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower, <0.01 denotes statistical significance level 1% or lower 
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Table 11: DIFFERENCES CORRELATION OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE OVER INDUSTRIES 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (1) Competition it = βC0 + βC1 * Leverage it + βC2 * Market Share it + ε it, with two-stage estimation, and 
testing for the differences in the correlation of debt level of firms and the industry concentration level over different industries.  Competition and leverage measures are 
varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  P-values presented correspond to Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the 
correlations of the competition proxies and candidate predictors between the different industries.  
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Market Share is a control variable in the “Competition” equation (see section 3.5) 
 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage 0.262 <0.01 0.071* <0.01 0.049* <0.01 0.042* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Market Share <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
N (firms/Industries) 4189/372 4211/373 4063/368 4000/368 4190/372 4211/373 4064/368 4001/368 3658/313 3680/314 3532/306 3480/306 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower, <0.01 denotes statistical significance level 1% or lower 
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Table 12: DIFFERENCES CORRELATION OF COMPETITION AND LEVERAGE OVER INDUSTRIES 
The table below reports results from estimating equation (2) Leverage it = βL0 + βL1 * Competition it + βL2 * Risk it + βL3 * Asset Tangibility it + βL4 * Collateral 
it + βL5 * Liquidity it + βL6 * Profitability it + βL7 * Growth Options and Assets it + βL8 * Dividend it + βL9 * Tax Advantages of Debt it + βL10 * Size it + ζ it., 
with two-stage estimation, and testing for the differences in the correlation of debt level of firms and the candidate predictors over different industries.  Competition 
and leverage measures are varied in each regression run and charted below for the various combinations as indicated.  P-values presented correspond to Kruskal-
Wallis test comparing the correlations of the competition proxies and candidate predictors between the different industries. 
 
CONC, HHI, and BOONE are measures of competition defined on the industry-wide level (see section 3.5) 
BVLD, MVLD, BVTD, MVTD are measures of leverage defined on the firm-specific level (see section 3.4) 
Risk, Asset Tangibility, Collateral, Liquidity, Profitability, Growth Options and Assets, Dividend, Tax Adv of Debt, Size are all control variables of the leverage 
equation (see section 3.4) 
 
CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Competition 0.262 <0.01 0.071 <0.01 0.049* <0.01 0.042* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Risk <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Asset Tangibility <0.01 <0.01 0.001 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.001* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.007* 0.001 
Collateral <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Liquidity 0.145 <0.01 0.027 <0.01 0.145 <0.01 0.027* <0.01 0.179 <0.01 0.011* <0.01 
Profitability 0.003 <0.01 0.027 <0.01 0.003* <0.01 0.027* <0.01 0.001* <0.01 0.008* <0.01 
Growth Options and Assets 0.002 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.002* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.001* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Dividend <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Tax Adv of Debt <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.008 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.008* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.006* 
Size <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
N (firms/Industries) 4189/372 4211/373 4063/368 4000/368 4190/372 4211/373 4064/368 4001/368 3658/313 3680/314 3532/306 3480/306 
* denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower, <0.01 denotes statistical significance level 1% or lower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
Table 13: GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
The Granger Causality test is done separately for each firm and then aggregate the results using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure.  As a result, we 
have only one p-value for each definition of Competition and Leverage.  The results are based on the choice of parameter m, which is set to 2  
 
Leverage is said Granger causes Competition with lags m, p and q if coefficients βCp - βCq are jointly statistically significant according to an F-test in 
the following regression: Competition
 it = µC0 + αC1 * Competition i(t-1) + … + αCm * Competition i(t-m) + βCp * Leverage i(t-p) + … + βCq * Leverage i(t-q) + 
γC1 * Market Share it + ε it. 
 
Likewise, Competition is said to Granger causes Leverage with lags m, p and q if coefficients βLp – βLq are jointly statistically significant according to an 
F-test in the following regression: Leverage
 it = µL0 + αL1 * Leverage i(t-1) + … + αLm * Leverage i(t-m) + βLp * Competition i(t-p) + … + βLq * Competition i(t-
q) + γL1 * Risk it + γL2 * Asset Tangibility it + γL3 * Collateral it + γL4 * Liquidity it + γL5 * Profitability it + γL6 * Growth Options and Assets it + γL7 * 
Dividend
 it + γL8 * Tax it Advantages of Debt it + γL9 * Size it+ ζ it. 
  CONC HHI BOONE 
  BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD BVLD MVLD BVTD MVTD 
Leverage ---> Competition <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Competition ---> Leverage <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.02* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
     <0.01 denotes statistical significance level 1% or lower, and * denotes statistical significance level 10% or lower 
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CHAPTER 2: DYNAMICS OF MULTI-MARKET TRADING 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 Early academic literature strived primarily to understand the motives and net benefits to 
the firms that list their shares outside of their home market22.  Many studies document the 
economic benefits of international cross-listings23.  However, there is disagreement on the 
sources of the value created through cross-listing (Siegel, 2009; Karolyi, 2012).  Beginning in 
the 2000's, academic focus changed from seeking to understand the motives of cross-listing 
toward understanding the economic consequences and dynamics of multi-market trading24.  This 
was driven by growing dissatisfaction with the market segmentation hypothesis25 as the 
reasoning of firms that chose to cross-list26.  Baruch (2007) and Halling (2008) show that while 
some stocks displayed very active trading in the foreign exchange after the cross-listing event, 
other firms demonstrate only limited trading.  The variability in the liquidity of cross-listed firms 
between home and host markets highlight the need to better understand the various factors 
influencing the distribution of the trading volume of a given multi-listed firm.   
This paper investigates the determinants of foreign versus domestic trading volume, and 
contributes to the literature by examining factors not yet considered in the extant literature that 
may impact trading volume distribution of stocks listed in two or more countries.  We frame our 
empirical investigation in the framework proposed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang 
(2002) in which investors’ trade to speculate on their private information or to rebalance their 
portfolios.  Their model predicts that returns generated by speculative trades (driven by informed 
investors) tend to continue themselves following high volume days, as the information embodied 
in the original trade is gradually impounded in the price by market participants.  On the other 
hand, returns generated by risk-sharing trades tend to reverse themselves following high volume 
                                                             
 
 
22
 Karolyi (1998) provides a comprehensive survey of earliest contributions on international cross-listings which 
primarily focused on the valuation and liquidity effects of cross-listing, as well as the impact to the company’s 
global risk exposure and cost of capital.   
23
 Studies from Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), Lang, Lins, 
and Miller (2003), Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2005), Coffee (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (2004) all examine the sources of economic benefit from international cross-listings for issuers.   
24
 The change in focus was set off from the findings of Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999).  They 
uncovered statistically-significant share price reactions of 1.15% on the day of the cross-listing announcement; 
further economically-large pre-listing share-price run-ups of 10% and post-listing declines of 9%; and the most 
dramatic share-price reactions for large numbers of emerging-market firms listing on major U.S. exchanges, Level I 
OTC listings and private placements (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010).   
25
 “Market segmentation hypothesis” is the positive revaluation that arises from the elimination of a “super risk 
premium” representing additional compensation demanded by local investors for their inability to diversify their 
risks globally (Errunza and Losq, 1985). 
26
 Karolyi, 2006 survey features a number of research initiatives, at the time, motivated with the growing 
dissatisfaction with the “conventional wisdom” of the market-segmentation hypothesis as a rationale for the choice 
of firms to cross-list. 
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days.  We believe that hedging trades are more likely to impact volume distribution in cross-
listed stocks, since a hedging trader’s intent is primarily to allocate risk.  This hypothesis is 
driven by the belief that a wider variety of stocks would become attractive to hedging traders 
attempting to diversify27.  However, study from Baruch et al. (2007) does predict a higher share 
of trading volume for stocks with greater correlation with other assets in the foreign market, i.e. 
less diversification benefits.  In other words, there are arguments for either side.   
  Several studies have suggested that culture plays an important role in the firm decision to 
cross-list28.  Chui et al (2010) find that cross-country cultural differences are positively 
associated with trading volume.  Hence, we argue that cross-country cultural differences 
measured with an individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001) may be an important 
determinant of trading volume distribution of multi-listed firms’ stocks.  The goal is to 
understand the extent to which the distribution of trading volume of stocks listed in two or more 
exchanges is influenced by the individualism measure.  The individualism factor does not 
directly measure the behavioral biases of over optimism and overconfidence.  However, 
literature studies in psychology suggest a link between individualism and overconfidence.  The 
individualism theory suggests that traders/ investors in countries with more individualistic 
cultures tend to be more confident in their abilities, and perhaps, overconfident29.  This 
confidence theoretically should impact trading volume in these countries; therefore we will seek 
to analyze this impact through testing. 
Pagano (1989) suggests that when a stock is traded on more than one exchange with 
different level of execution costs, the trading from other exchanges should migrate to the 
exchange with the lowest trading cost.  Therefore, another factor that we consider for their effect 
on the distribution of trading volume is a measure of price impact employed in Amihud’s (2002) 
survey.  This measure is intended to represent the daily price response associated with each 
dollar of trading volume.  The larger the price impact measure, the greater is the impact of 
trading on prices, indicating a more illiquid market.  In other words, it is measure of market 
liquidity i.e. an asset's ability to be sold without causing a significant movement in the price and 
with minimum loss of value.  We expect that the trading volume distribution of cross-listed 
stocks would be affected by the liquidity level of the market in which it is listed.   
 Chordia et al.’s (2007) study of the impact of liquidity trading measure on the trading 
activities of a sample of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks is at the base of the succeeding 
measure used in determining its impact on trading volume distribution.  Chordia et al. study 
suggests that the extent of liquidity trading depends on stock visibility.  Book to market, amongst 
others, is proposed as a proxy for firm visibility.  Hence, we explore the relationship between 
book to market ratio and trading volume distribution of multi-listed firms.      
 Another potential determinant of trading volume distribution is the relative volatility of 
stock itself.  This measure of a stock’s risk is a key factor in many investment decisions.  The 
literature on the whole is not conclusive on this measure as it relates to volume distribution of 
                                                             
 
 
27
 Dodd et al. (2012) findings suggest that the ratio of foreign to domestic trading volume is larger when the return 
correlation between host and home market returns is low, that is, when the stock offers diversification benefits to 
foreign investors. 
28
 Sarkissian and Schill (2004) finds that firms prefer to cross-list in markets that are more similar to their home 
market from an economic, industrial, geographic and cultural perspective.  Licht (2004) argue that cultural distance 
between the foreign and home market significantly impact the degree of legal bonding attained from cross-listing.  
29
 Individualism has been linked to overconfidence (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010). 
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cross-listed stocks.  Therefore, we will evaluate the impact of relative volatility on volume 
distribution of cross-listed shares within our dataset. 
 In summary, this paper contributes to the development of this research area in that we 
explicitly associate the influence of trading motives of investors, a culture dimension factor: 
individualism, the daily stock price response associated with each dollar of trading volume, 
market to book ratio, as well as the relative volatility of stocks on the volume distribution of 
stocks from globally cross-listed firms. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the necessary 
background information.  Section III reviews the prior literature relevant to developing the 
hypotheses. Section IV provides more details on the factors. The sample and research design are 
discussed in Section V. Concluding remarks are presented in Section VI. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
 
The globalization trend led investors to seek diversification benefits by investing in the 
foreign equity market.  Subsequently, firms also gained interest in raising capital globally by 
offering their shares on other exchanges outside of their home country (see Saugadaran (1988), 
Karolyi (1998, 2006), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004)).  They 
did so through cross-listing or depository receipts programs.  Cross-listing refers to the listing of 
a company’s common share on a different exchange than its primary and original stock 
exchange.  Depositary Receipts (DRs) are transferable securities issued by depositary banks, 
which represent ownership of a given number of a foreign company’s shares. These can be listed 
and traded independently from the underlying shares.   
In 2012, a total of 133.4 billion DRs were traded in terms of volume and US $2.53 trillion in 
terms of dollar value traded.  At the end of 2012, there were more than 2,300 Sponsored DR 
programs available for more than 1,750 companies from 85 countries.  The DR market continues 
to grow with 89 new sponsored American Depository Receipt (ADR) programs and 208 
unsponsored ADR programs added in 2012. Over the past 5 years, 605 new sponsored DR 
programs have been setup by 533 companies from 56 countries, demonstrating the continued 
growth of the market throughout the financial crisis (Deutsche Bank Depositary Receipts, 
Overview of 2012).  The firms’ ultimate goal in offering their shares outside of their home 
market ranges from gaining access to larger pools of capital, increasing trading volumes, to 
positioning firm for better governance rule for the benefit of investors (Karolyi, 2006, 2010; 
King & Mittoo, 2007).   
 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
  
Significant research exists on the area of trading volume in general, i.e. not specific to 
cross-listed firms.  This study focuses on understanding the relative importance of determinants 
that may affect the distribution of trading volume of cross-listed firms.  Therefore, this section 
reviews the background literature on this topic beginning with a discussion of general volume 
studies, following very broadly with early work documenting and evaluating the growing trend 
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of stock cross-listing; and subsequently, evolving to studies that sought to understand why there 
is variation in the success among various firms that cross-list their shares, i.e. volume 
distribution.   
 
3.1 Volume and Cross-listing literature 
 Madhavan’s (2000) survey on market microstructure highlights several volume related 
research studies.  Amihud and Mendelson’s (1980) research on asset pricing shows that expected 
returns are a decreasing function of liquidity.  French and Roll’s (1986) research shows the 
importance of information trading in price determination through an empirical study of the 
variability of stock returns over trading and non-trading days.  They find the trading process 
itself causes about 12% of the daily return variance.   
Looking at the general behavior of stock, research shows that price patterns are expected 
to vary in response to trades with different information content.  Studies investigating the 
relationship between trading volume and aggregate stock return predictability at short horizons 
originate from the following authors.  Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) find that for both 
stock indexes and individual large stocks, the first-order daily return autocorrelation tends to 
decline with volume.  Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) investigate the joint dynamics of price 
changes and volume on the stock market.  They find that daily trading volume is positively and 
nonlinearly related to the magnitude of the daily price change.  Large price movements are 
associated with higher subsequent volume.   
Hasbrouck’s (1995) study of price discovery linked information shares (magnitude and 
persistence of arbitrage gaps) to the proportion of actual trading activity that take place across 
competing markets.  Amihud et al. (1991, 1997) follows up with other studies supporting this 
original theory, documenting large changes in asset values for stocks moving to more liquid 
exchanges.  It follows then that findings from this line of research could be applied to cross-
listed stocks to evaluate the impact on trading volume since a commonly noted benefit of cross-
listing is to gain access to more liquid markets. 
 Both Siegel (2009) and Karolyi (2012) have evaluated the sources of the benefits 
associated with cross-listing stocks, but overall evidence remains mixed. Bancel and Mittoo 
(2001) both note that corporate managers often cite an increase in stock liquidity as primary 
benefits.  This view is supported by Foester and Karolyi’s (1998) work which show that trading 
volume and value increase significantly when compared to before cross-listing.  While this is 
true when viewed very broadly, it was shown that for some stocks the impact on trading volume 
is limited in many cases (Halling, et al., 2008; Baruch, et al., 2007).   
Baruch et al. (2007) developed a new model of multimarket trading to explain the 
differences in the foreign share of trading volume of internationally cross-listed stocks.  They 
investigate the variation in the US share of global trading volume across a sample of non-US 
stocks cross-listed on US exchanges.  Their model predicts that under general conditions, the 
distribution of trading volume across home and host exchanges are related to the correlation of 
the cross-listed asset returns with the returns of other assets traded in the respective markets.  
They use a measure of incremental information based on the difference in R2 of two regressions 
to explain the company’s stock return. The first regression uses only the home market index 
return as explanatory variable, and the second regression utilizes both the foreign and the 
domestic market’s index return.  The information factor, in other words, quantifies the 
incremental contribution of foreign market movements in explaining a company’s stock price in 
addition to the information contained in its domestic market returns. After controlling for a host 
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of factors, they find that in their sample, the US fraction of global trading is strongly, positively 
related to the US calculated measure of information factor.    
 Halling et al. (2008) investigates cross-listed firms and finds evidence of a decrease in 
foreign trading volume following a listing event.  However, they also find that this occurrence 
was not consistent for firms from less developed markets, markets with worse insider-trading 
laws, small, high growth and technology-oriented companies, as well as firms from a different 
time-zone.  
 Seizing on the questions raised by Halling et al. (2008) relative to the potential impact of 
other variables on the distribution of trading volume, Wang and Zhou (2012), undertake a study to 
examine the cross-country distribution of trading volume of globally cross-listed firms.  In 
addition, for firms that cross-list on multiple foreign host markets, they also review trading volume 
distribution, as well as the influence of the market and firms’ characteristics among competing host 
markets.  They document evidence of a higher share of trading volume for host markets that 
provide more information about the price of cross-listed firms.  The information factor is the extent 
of information provided about the price of the cross-listed firm.  It is a measure of the incremental 
information provided by a new market, in addition to those provided by the existing markets.  It is 
estimated based on a generalized Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2007) (BKL) model to allow for a 
prediction on the dependence of a stock’s dynamic volume-return relationship on the extent of 
information asymmetry.  To estimate the information regarding the price of stock i provided by a 
new market, they regress weekly returns of stock i in the domestic home market, on the weekly 
index returns in the existing market.  The information factor, in other words, is estimated as the 
correlation of a stock with other assets in the host market.  They document evidence of a higher 
share of trading volume for host markets that provide more information about prices of cross-listed 
firms, are closer to home markets, have lower trading costs, better information protection, and 
share a common language or legal origin with the home markets.   
 
3.2 Factors Affecting Trading Volume Distribution by Extant Research 
Halling et al. (2008) in their analysis of the location of stock trading with a US cross-
listing, state that if after a cross-listing, competing markets continue to coexist, in principle, the 
variables that could affect the distribution of trading volume between two markets belong to 
three groups: (i) those relevant for non-information-based trading; (ii) those relevant for 
information-based trading, and (iii) those measuring trading frictions. Whereas, prior studies 
broadly categorized these variables into more broad “motives”: fundamental and informational 
(Pagano, 1989; Chowdry and Nanda, 1991; Huddart, et al., 1999).  Regardless of the 
categorization, many of the variables generally overlap in these studies, e.g. diversification 
(market correlation), legal environment, market proximity, and stock risk, among others.  The 
related literature specific to the variables we will be evaluating in the paper will be reviewed 
below. 
 
 
42 
 
4.  Additional Factors Considered by This Study and Their 
Measurements 
 
 
This section discusses the additional factors that we will explore as determinants of 
trading volume distribution: Trading Motives, Culture Factor, Price Impact, Market to Book, and 
Relative Volatility. 
 
Trading Motives: Hedging or Speculative  
A factor not previously examined in the literature of trading volume distribution for 
cross-listed firms is the impact of trading motives: speculative or hedging.  Focusing on the 
relationship between trading volume and short-horizon individual stock return autocorrelation, 
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang’s (2002) study presents a model that documents additional 
evidence on the nature of the dynamic volume-return relation.  They argue that stock returns 
autocorrelations under trading volume can reveal the main motive for trading.  They depict two 
important motives for trading: allocation of risk (hedging trade) and speculation on future returns 
(speculative trade) based on coefficient generated from their model.  They find that stocks 
associated with a high degree of informed trading, i.e. speculative trades, exhibit more return 
continuation on high volume days.  Stocks that are associated with a low degree of informed 
trading, i.e. hedging trades, show more return reversal on high volume days.  The authors explain 
that information-motivated trades, because they reveal new information, shift stock prices 
permanently.  On the other hand, liquidity-driven trades only induce temporary price pressure 
effects.  The stock prices change in order to attract risk-averse investors, and then these 
deviations are reversed.  We suspect that hedging trades are more likely to drive increase volume 
distribution in cross-listed stocks, since the goal there is to diversify risk and cross-listed stocks 
may be well positioned to assist.  However, some studies such as Baruch et al. (2007) provide 
valid arguments that would suggest the opposite.  Therefore, our methodology will include this 
variable in which the correlation will imply the trading motivation.  A significant positive 
correlation would indicate informed trading, a negative one would indicate portfolio balancing, 
and an insignificant correlation would indicate that neither motivation dominates, i.e. likely 
random liquidity trading. Specifically, for each stock in each exchange, we estimate the 
following.  
 
(Equation 1) Ri,t+1=C01+C1i.Ri,t+C2i .Vi,t Ri,t +ei,t+1  
 
where Ri,t is the daily return of the stock on day t and Vi,t is the daily trading volume 
measured as daily turnover.  Daily turnover is the total number of shares traded during 
the day (t) divided by the total shares outstanding for each stock.  We should expect 
statistically significant positive values of C2 coefficients for stocks that are associated 
with high degree of speculative trades and significantly negative values of C2 for stocks 
with primarily hedging trades.  Returns are generated by three sources: public 
information about future payoffs (C1=0), investors’ hedging trades resulting in negative 
serially correlated returns (C2 < 0) and speculative trades with statistically positive 
returns (C2 > 0). 
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Culture:  Individualism   
 Hofstede (2001) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”.  Sarkissian and 
Schill (2004), Licht (2004), Daugherty and Georgieva (2011) and Dodd, Frinjns, and Gilbert 
(2012) are several studies that suggest the impact of culture on cross-listing.  Work by Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004) shows that firms prefer to cross-list on markets that are closer in proximity to 
the home market.  This proximity, however, may be measured in terms of physical distance 
(geographic), cultural, or economically.  In 2004, Licht takes this a step further arguing that the 
legal bonding resulting from cross-listing is also impacted by the cultural distance.  On the same 
topic, it was shown that cultural similarity also impacts a firm's decision to de-list from the US 
markets (Daugherty and Georgieva, 2011).  Dodd, Frinjns, and Gilbert (2012) examined the role 
of cultural similarity in a firm's choice of which host market to cross-list, and found that there 
was a greater propensity for a firm to cross list in a country with similar values as the home 
market.  Studies in psychology have suggested that there is a link between individualism and 
overconfidence30.  Ahern, Danielle, and Fracassi (2012) investigate the effect of cultural values 
on mergers around the world.  They find significant and economically meaningful effect of 
culture on the volume of mergers.  Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) examine the impact of culture 
on the returns of momentum strategies.  They find that people in individualistic culture tend to be 
more optimistic about their abilities.  They point to the findings of Odean (1998) as evidence.  
This study shows a correlation between the individualism measure and trading volume and 
volatility of stocks.  Glaser and Weber (2009), as well as Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink’s 
(2006) research also suggest that overconfidence generates excess trading activity.31  The 
individualism index is based on survey conducted by Geert Hofstede and is available on the web.    
 
Liquidity and Visibility: Price Impact, Market to Book ratio 
More active markets tend to be more liquid.  Liquidity is referred to as the ability to buy 
or sell significant quantities of a security quickly, anonymously, and with minimal or no price 
impact.  There is substantial literature documenting that cross-listing improves a stock’s 
liquidity32.  Kyle (1985) suggests that prices are set in the market at an increasing function of 
order flow because market makers are unable to distinguish between order flows generated by 
informed traders as opposed to liquidity traders.  Hence, Amihud’s proxy ‘price impact’ is based 
on the idea that illiquidity is the relationship between the price change and the associated order 
flow or trading volume.  Halling, Moulton, and Panayides (2011) examined the dynamics of 
trading volume in a multimarket setting in order to capture the degree to which traders actively 
exploit multimarket environments33 and treat competing markets as one market.  They show that 
                                                             
 
 
30
 Hofstede (2001) classifies cultures into five dimensions and identifies individualism as the most closely related to 
overconfidence and self-attribution bias. 
31
 Another potential determinant of trading volume distribution is related relative risk aversion of investors.  Bakshi 
and Chen (1994) investigate the extent to which stock price movements are influence by variations in population age 
structure.  They argue that investor’s relative risk aversion increase with age. In Bakshi and Chen (1994), the 
weighted average age of the country population of persons 20 and older is used as measurement of age distribution. 
32
 See Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) for comprehensive survey. 
33
 Multimarket environments refer to an environment where trading of shares of the same firm occurs in multiple 
markets.  The focus of their study is to understand the extent to which investors are able and willing to trade in both 
markets; and the factors that may influence their behavior. 
44 
 
there is a strong association between liquidity improvements using Amihud’s proxy for liquidity 
and “multimarket trading” measured as the correlation of trading volume shocks in domestic and 
cross-listed shares34. 
Chordia et al. (2007) test whether trading activity of stocks depends upon the degree of 
liquidity trading.  They hypothesize that liquidity trading depends both on a stock’s visibility, 
proxied by book to market ratio, and on portfolio rebalancing needs triggered by past price 
performance.   They find that the impact of book to market on unsigned trading activity is not as 
robust as the coefficients of book to market changes in different sub periods and when 
controlling for the effect of earnings.  Models by Pagano (1989) and Chowdry and Nanda (1991) 
show that cross-listing may not always enhance liquidity due to potential offsetting impact of 
market fragmentation.  
Amihud’s Price Impact measure (proxy of illiquidity) (Ai,t=Illiq or Illiquidity ratio) is 
obtained from daily data and is defined as the absolute (percentage) price change per dollar of 
annual trading volume.     
        
ri,j = daily return 
dvoli,t = dollar volume 
  
Market to Book measure (Stock visibility) is defined by 
(Equation 3)    Market to Book ratio = Market value of assets/Book value of 
assets 
 
Relative Volatility 
Risky stocks drive more active trading among investors because riskier companies have 
higher level of prediction error, which require more frequent rebalancing of foreign investors’ 
portfolios (Chordia, 2007).  Riskier stocks are also more likely to cross-list in more developed 
markets as shown by Abdallah and Goergen (2008).  This seems to indicate that high-risk stocks 
are more attractive to foreign investors.  Halling, et al. (2008) found differing effects for 
volatility impact on the share of U.S. trading volume depending on whether the company is 
based in a developed or emerging market.  We will examine the variable, relative volatility with 
respect to the US (host) market to investigate the measure’s impact on volume distribution.  
Relative Volatility is the standard deviation of weekly stock returns in the host market relative to 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns in the home market.     
 
 
                                                             
 
 
34
 They explain that positive volume shock correlations could arise from multimarket trading of discretionary traders 
or correlated trading needs of captive investors who respond to public firm-specific news or common economic 
shocks across markets.  However, they explain that if correlated trading volume shocks were driven purely by 
correlated trading needs in the two markets, there should be no relation between the trading volume shock 
correlations and multimarket trading barriers and benefits such as liquidity. 
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5. Data and Methodology 
 
 
5.1 Data and Sample 
Our study examines a large sample of international firms from several countries whose 
shares are traded in their home market and in the U.S. concurrently through an American 
Depositary Receipt (ADR) facility.  The initial sample consists of all companies whose shares 
were cross-listed in the U.S. major stock markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) at any point in 
time between 1993 and 2013.35  Cross-listed firm names, stock ticker and CUSIP, ratio of ADR 
to ordinary share, listed exchange and level, region, industry, originality, underlying stock 
exchange, depositary bank, and effective date are obtained from the ADR universe on 
www.adr.com.  Following the sample selection method of Wang and Zhou (2012), we will 
exclude financial firms, investment funds and trusts, firms from tax haven regions, as well as 
firms lacking data during the sample period selected.  The size of the sample is further 
constrained by data availability.  We retain ADRs classified as exchange-listed Level II and 
Level III (capital-raising) programs and exclude over-the-counter issues (Level I ADRs), as well 
as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation S shares and private placements 
issues falling under SEC Rule 144a. We also exclude preferred shares, Real Estate Investment 
Trust units.  Cross-listed stocks with no home-market counterpart available are also discarded. 
We collect daily data on prices, return, number of shares traded, shares outstanding, market 
capitalization, and bid-ask spread from DataStream for the sample of ADR in their home and 
host exchanges. 
 
5.2 Analyzing the Relative Importance of Factors 
This section presents the methodology to be used in the empirical investigation of the 
determinants of the distribution of trading volume of the cross-listed stocks between foreign and 
domestic markets in a multivariate framework.  
Similar to Halling et al. (2008), we measure the dependent variable, volume share, as the 
ratio of domestic to foreign trading volume for each cross-listed share.  More precisely, volume 
share is defined as the trading volume on a host market divided by the trading volume on the 
home (foreign) market.   
 
(Equation 5)           (VolHT,i/VolHM )       
  
We examine the relation between the explanatory variables and trading volume 
shares in the following regression analysis.   
(Equation 6)  Ln(VolHT,i/VolHM)it = β0 + β1(Trading MotiveHT/Trading MotiveHM)it + β2 (IndHT-
IndHM)i + β3 (Price ImpactHT/ Price ImpactHM)it + β4 (MTBHT/ MTBHM)it + β5 (VolatilityHT/ 
VolatilityHM)it + µ it 
The dependent variable (volume shares) and explanatory variables trading motive, price 
impact, market to book (MTB), and relative volatility (RVol) vary over time. We estimate each 
                                                             
 
 
35
 Sample includes companies that were listed prior to 1993, as well as companies delisted prior to the end of the 
sample.   
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of these explanatory variables for each cross-listed stock in each calendar year by calculating 
their time-series annual average.  In addition, we calculate the cross-sectional average of these 
factors for all cross-listings on the home and host market.36  The explanatory variable, 
individualism (Ind), is constant and varies only by exchange.  The individualism factor was 
evaluated as the difference between the U.S. and home markets, rather than as a ratio. 
We will run two sets of regression analyses.  The first will be a purely cross-sectional 
analysis including all variables (time-varying and fixed) in which the time-varying variables will 
be defined by their average across the applicable time period, and the second analysis will 
exclude the fixed variable, individualism, in a panel regression.     
 
 
 
6. Results 
 
 Table 1 below shows the average values, for trading volume distribution (Volume Share), 
trading motive (Motive Ratio), culture differences (Culture Diff), illiquidity (Illiquidity Ratio), 
visibility (Visibility Ratio), as well as volatility (Volatility Ratio) of cross-listed firms on the host 
market relative to values in their home market exchange.  Volume share factor is the ratio of host 
trading volume to the home trading volume.  It shows that the relative share of trading volume 
for cross listed firms is approximately 5.28 times more than the share volume experience in the 
firms’ home country37.    
                                                             
 
 
36
 Average price impact is calculated as the time series average for every firm in its domestic market, as well as in 
the host market.  The difference between the averages for every company (price impact at home – price impact on 
host) defines the price impact differences between the home and host markets.   
37
 We limit our sample, and do not include firms from Canada, which in other studies accounts for close to half of 
the sample data, which could justify differences in the average volume share seen in other studies. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of foreign cross-listings 
The table reports summary statistics of all cross-listings.   
Volume Share is calculated as the ratio of companies trading volume in the host market to the trading volume in the firm's home market.   
Motive Ratio is determined by the sign of the correlation coefficient of the regression of returns on Ri,t+1=C01+C1i.Ri,t+C2i .Vi,t Ri,t +ei,t+1 where Ri,t is the 
daily return of the stock on day t and Vi,t is the daily trading volume measured as daily turnover.  Daily turnover is the total number of shares traded during the 
day (t) divided by the total shares outstanding for each stock.  Motive ratio is the ratio of the average C2 factors on the host market by the C2 factors on the home 
market. 
Culture Diff is calculated as the difference in the individualism index of the Host country to that of the Home country.  This index is based on survey conducted 
by Geert Hofstede and is available on the web. 
Illiquidity Ratio is defined as the absolute (percentage) price change per dollar of annual trading volume in the Host exchange relative to the Home exchange.  
Visibility Ratio is defined as the Host to Home market to book ratio. 
Volatility Ratio is the standard deviation of weekly stock returns in the host market relative to the standard deviation of weekly stock returns in the home 
market. 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Id 2207 
  
653 54660 
Date 2207 
  
Mar, 1994 Dec, 2013 
VOLUME SHARE 2210 5.2872 2.446946 -1.876801 14.60938 
MOTIVE RATIO 1267 -0.0229475 1.563204 -6.657308 7.268738 
CULTURE DIFF 2231 37.43523 24.79724 1 78 
ILLIQUIDITY RATIO 2210 -5.651614 2.166451 -15.07078 1.634969 
VISIBILITY RATIO 2206 -2.36672 1.726983 -13.83571 3.619863 
VOLATILITY RATIO 2231 0.0412624 0.2623259 -1.384045 3.017281 
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Table 2 covers the average correlation coefficients between our variables in the model examined.  
The absolute values of correlation coefficients between the each of the independent variables are 
are mostly less than 0.3.   
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1257 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
  
VOLUME 
SHARE 
MOTIVE 
RATIO 
CULTURE 
DIFF 
ILLIQUIDITY 
RATIO 
VISIBILITY 
RATIO 
MOTIVERATIO 0.106         
CULTUREDIFF 0.2194 0.0063       
LIQUIDITYRATIO -0.8715 -0.134 -0.2136     
VISIBILITYRATIO 0.4197 0.0884 0.1225 -0.5841   
VOLATILITYRATIO 0.0316 0.039 0.0303 0.0517 -0.12 
 
 
Distribution of Trading Volumes between Home and Host Markets 
 
 The table below shows the distribution of countries (home) with firms cross-listed on stock exchanges in the United States (host), excluding 
Canada.  We evaluated a total of 172 firms listed on US exchanges.  These 172 firms represent listings from a total of 33 home markets.  Of these 
markets, the United Kingdom has the largest number of firms listed on US markets, with several other countries tied for the lowest number of cross 
listings, at 1.   
 
 
Table 3 present the distribution of the 172 cross-listed firms from 33 different home markets listed in the U.S. major stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) between the 
time period 1993 and 2013.  Values shown are the country average of the values examined for firms in their home and host exchange market. 
 
Excluded are firms from Canada, financial firms, investment funds and trust firms, as well as firms from tax haven regions.   
We retain ADRs classified as exchange-listed Level II and Level III (capital-raising) programs and exclude over-the-counter issues (Level I ADRs), as well as Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation S shares and private placements issues falling under SEC Rule 144a.  
We also exclude preferred shares, Real Estate Investment Trust units.  Cross-listed stocks with no home-market counterpart available are also discarded. 
country      COMPANIES LISTED 
Volume 
Home 
Volume  
Host 
Motive  
Home 
Motive  
Host 
Culture 
Home 
Culture 
Host 
Illiquidity 
Home 
Illiquidity 
Host 
Visibility 
Home 
Visibility 
Host 
Volatility 
Home 
Volatility 
Host 
Argentina 8 219.9937 1039606 -0.2036 -0.2022 46 91 2.2E-06 2.4E-09 11900000 2532849 0.530 0.600 
Australia 8 5925.439 1233372 -0.1967 -0.1642 90 91 3.1E-06 3.8E-09 14000000 959921.4 0.840 0.819 
Belgium 2 839.3569 298388.1 -0.0548 -0.1358 75 91 2.5E-09 2.9E-11 32600000 28600000 0.390 0.392 
Brazil 11 2185.725 1.19E+08 -0.0082 -0.8121 38 91 5.9E-07 1.6E-09 11900000 4307444 0.536 0.570 
Chile 4 8014.977 6339419 -0.0111 -0.1372 23 91 1.6E-07 1.5E-10 4514526 528909.4 0.440 0.422 
China 14 23134.94 5778190 -0.1778 -0.2946 20 91 1.8E-08 2.4E-10 19500000 470735.2 0.599 0.638 
Colombia 1 9204.598 6139343 -0.0221 -0.1545 13 91 4.3E-09 5.7E-11 81000000 2661006 0.395 0.444 
Denmark 2 4053.837 77190.94 -0.0985 -0.0583 74 91 1.9E-07 2.5E-09 2657483 1049538 0.509 0.814 
Finland 1 24816.09 15200000 -0.1134 -0.2877 63 91 6.6E-10 5.6E-13 57700000 18200000 0.595 0.591 
France 7 4494.694 560929 -0.1706 -0.1065 71 91 5.7E-08 2.1E-10 44700000 2928090 0.485 0.502 
Germany 5 62.7276 527421.6 -0.2357 -0.1039 67 91 2.6E-07 1.2E-09 29100000 1912379 0.507 0.539 
Greece 1 308.844 24478.69 -0.0154 -0.2258 35 91 1.2E-08 4.4E-10 9288621 188468.6 0.487 0.468 
Hong Kong 7 24181 6724937 -0.1229 -0.217 25 91 6.2E-07 4.5E-09 43800000 1104051 0.729 0.726 
India 9 2955.531 952161.2 0.1258 -0.1967 48 91 2.0E-07 6.1E-10 5211172 806782.7 0.689 0.722 
Indonesia 1 7296.802 74461.41 -0.1118 -0.198 14 91 5.0E-08 1.4E-10 1770185 369156 0.589 0.512 
Ireland 5 1968.824 907075.4 -0.3506 -0.0416 70 91 2.0E-06 1.0E-09 5901226 1222540 0.498 0.494 
Israel 6 264.31 2715549 -0.1608 -0.1044 54 91 3.2E-07 9.9E-10 5086152 4066462 0.475 0.510 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 cont. present the distribution of the 172 cross-listed firms from 33 different home markets listed in the U.S. major stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) 
between the time period 1993 and 2013.   
Values shown are the country average of the values examined for firms in their home and host exchange market. 
 
Excluded are firms from Canada, financial firms, investment funds and trust firms, as well as firms from tax haven regions.   
We retain ADRs classified as exchange-listed Level II and Level III (capital-raising) programs and exclude over-the-counter issues (Level I ADRs), as well as Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation S shares and private placements issues falling under SEC Rule 144a.  
We also exclude preferred shares, Real Estate Investment Trust units.  Cross-listed stocks with no home-market counterpart available are also discarded. 
country      COMPANIES LISTED 
Volume 
Home 
Volume  
Host 
Motive  
Home 
Motive  
Host 
Culture 
Home 
Culture 
Host 
Illiquidity 
Home 
Illiquidity 
Host 
Visibility 
Home 
Visibility 
Host 
Volatility 
Home 
Volatility 
Host 
Italy 2 11797.43 447226.2 -0.1012 -0.1381 76 91 3.4E-09 1.2E-11 57700000 1404847 0.365 0.359 
Japan 12 3053.854 222853.5 0.0657 -0.0826 46 91 1.1E-08 1.8E-09 24600000 1031844 0.421 0.416 
Mexico 8 5121.361 19800000 -0.1127 -0.1272 30 91 2.2E-07 9.1E-10 5070119 4433115 0.536 0.548 
Netherland 1 8721.495 1031265 -0.1715 -0.3518 80 91 4.2E-10 2.8E-12 29400000 3480250 0.458 0.456 
Norway 1 8304.163 995252 -0.2799 -0.3856 69 91 8.2E-10 2.8E-11 56500000 1252805 0.427 0.416 
Philippines 1 162.8915 171534.6 -0.2551 -0.241 32 91 1.9E-08 1.8E-11 5941659 1476006 0.420 0.412 
Portugal 1 4674.439 181323.8 -0.1358 -0.1988 27 91 2.7E-09 3.8E-11 7054510 515595.9 0.361 0.383 
Russia 2 846.3413 3516274 -0.1709 -0.5169 39 91 1.2E-07 2.9E-12 12400000 4990457 0.607 0.705 
South Africa 5 1059.101 6315453 -0.0541 -0.0892 65 91 1.5E-07 2.1E-10 6010875 1309674 0.574 0.564 
South Korea 5 939.0795 253106.9 -0.0961 -0.1743 18 91 3.6E-09 9.8E-12 14800000 2449020 0.505 0.495 
Spain 3 22583.08 951722.3 -0.0643 -0.0614 51 91 1.1E-08 9.6E-11 47100000 2913794 0.451 0.495 
Sweden 1 18441.24 5873954 -0.1603 -0.2648 71 91 5.5E-10 1.5E-12 102000000 6710815 0.583 0.904 
Switzerland 5 4434.108 873414.4 -0.1197 -0.0882 68 91 1.8E-09 7.9E-11 42800000 3902431 0.407 0.409 
Taiwan 7 42264.41 9713260 -0.1439 -0.1765 17 91 3.9E-09 3.8E-10 7781094 863201.1 0.521 0.592 
Turkey 1 5866.902 1168879 -0.2096 -0.1283 37 91 5.7E-09 5.2E-11 8941930 793053.1 0.597 1.062 
U.K. 25 19566.78 4537348 -0.0722 -0.1747 89 91 2.5E-07 7.6E-10 36900000 5620705 0.405 0.489 
ALL 
COUNTRIES 172 9843.553 7735480 -0.1018 -0.1811 54 91 4.4E-07 1.0E-09 22500000 2925949 0.512 0.549 
Table 4 shows the mean values of ratios of company and market characteristics evaluated at the 
country level.  All of the characteristics evaluated in the paper are company characteristics with 
the exception of culture, which is a market characteristic.  We first calculate the ratio of volume 
share (Volratio) defined as the volume of the host markets divided by the volume of the home 
market.  Note that this measure only examines the US volume versus the home market, and not 
trading on other host markets on which a firm may be listed.  We found that, on average, the US 
market attracts 5.25 times the trading volume of the corresponding home market.  The country 
with the largest difference in trading volume is Russia, with the US attracting approximately 9 
times more volume, followed by the German markets.  The country with the least difference is 
Indonesia, with the US markets attracting approximately 2 times the trading volume as their 
markets.   
Next, we look at trading motive (equation 1), as a factor that may influence the trading 
volume distribution of cross-listed firms in the host country relative to the home country.   We 
calculate the yearly trading motive for each cross listed firm, as well as the time series average of 
the trading motive for each firm.  Also each the average for all firms in a given country is taken 
with the results shown in Table 4.  The average trading motive among the firms was -1.39.  23 of 
the 33 countries primarily have a different trading motive than the U.S., as indicated by the 
negative values.  The remaining 10 have the same trading motives.  Trades in the U.S. in general 
have hedging motive as strategy. 
Next, we examined the culture factor of the home versus host markets.  This was 
measured by subtracting the Hofstede index for each country from that of the United States.  
Therefore, the larger the difference between the indices, the more significant the difference is in 
culture between the two countries.  The average difference in the Hofstede index was 36.89.  The 
country most similar in culture to the US was Australia with a difference of 1, followed by the 
U.K. with a difference of 2.  The countries with the greatest difference in culture from the US 
were Columbia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea with differences of 78, 77, 74, and 73, 
respectively. 
Next, the difference in the liquidity of the firms’ shares in the home versus host markets 
was examined.  Amihud’s price impact measure (equation 2) is used as the measure for stock 
illiquidity and the ratio of US versus the home country is shown in Table 4.  The average relative 
price impact is shown to be 0.032.  The countries with the most difference in liquidity relative to 
US are Argentina and Russia with at 0.00071 and 0.0034 respectively.  The country most similar 
in liquidity is Japan at 0.129. 
The next characteristic examined is stock visibility, measured by market to book ratio 
(equation 3).  The average difference in stock visibility is 0.446.  The country with the highest 
difference in stock visibility compared to the US was South Africa with 1.69.  The country with 
the lowest difference was Norway at 0.019. 
Lastly, volatility measure was examined between US and host market.  The average 
difference in volatility was measured at 1.09.  The country with the highest and lowest difference 
was Turkey at 1.34 and Indonesia at 0.892, respectively.
Table 4 summarizes mean values for characteristics studied by country of origin.  Mean values are calculated by averaging the variables ratios within each home country. 
COUNTRY COMPANIES LISTED 
VOLUME 
SHARE MOTIVE RATIO 
CULTURE 
DIFF 
ILLIQUIDITY 
RATIO 
VISIBILITY 
RATIO 
VOLATILITY 
RATIO 
Argentina 8 8.601625 -15.58009 45 0.0007123 1.255763 1.16219 
Australia 8 4.601905 -0.2083123 1 0.0341119 0.2184671 1.030291 
Belgium 2 3.759392 -0.2429382 16 0.0195543 0.3445948 1.005185 
Brazil 11 7.443811 4.561736 53 0.0035773 0.7008642 1.132456 
Chile 4 5.189591 -2.734097 68 0.0011759 0.1358708 1.021824 
China 14 5.197524 3.366598 71 0.0142176 0.0746278 1.182699 
Colombia 1 6.1639 1.173 78 0.00593 0.0643 1.15229 
Denmark 2 2.693829 -1.81635 17 0.022587 1.164865 1.344934 
Finland 1 6.0118 -56.538 28 0.00315 1.1076 1.05736 
France 7 4.404571 -0.8523896 20 0.0446151 0.1210546 1.04152 
Germany 5 8.049944 0.9787331 24 0.0017041 0.1140158 1.099936 
Greece 1 3.8743 0.304 56 0.0722 0.0235 0.96584 
Hong Kong 7 5.386426 -0.9456071 66 0.0045749 0.0933856 1.034661 
India 9 5.93027 -4.113581 43 0.0084695 0.2643176 1.122818 
Indonesia 1 2.0094 2.253 77 0.00241 0.4714 0.89273 
Ireland 5 6.824564 -1.301455 21 0.0232201 0.5321603 1.041024 
Israel 6 6.807738 -0.8167684 37 0.0086026 0.7474823 1.14359 
Italy 2 3.911183 0.7419321 15 0.0363962 0.0597596 1.006128 
Japan 12 3.218972 0.5381683 45 0.1294757 0.8417371 1.007173 
Mexico 8 7.04191 -2.338519 61 0.0035649 0.8639063 1.058686 
Netherland 1 4.8027 -0.155 11 0.01527 0.1187 1.01541 
Norway 1 4.3187 0.243 22 0.0373 0.019 0.97334 
Philippines 1 6.9067 0.751 59 0.00248 0.2942 1.02434 
Portugal 1 3.3836 -2.753 64 0.04318 0.1585 1.11359 
Russia 2 8.969223 28.90332 52 0.0003498 0.3646692 1.315647 
South Africa 5 6.840566 1.343195 26 0.0188356 1.692409 1.018566 
South Korea 5 5.740272 -0.9256411 73 0.0099276 0.2373975 1.03905 
Spain 3 3.374214 1.734219 40 0.0371568 0.268906 1.114703 
Sweden 1 5.6025 -11.232 20 0.00553 0.3769 1.22908 
Switzerland 5 4.589351 -5.804907 23 0.0494495 0.0822878 1.038991 
Taiwan 7 4.630335 -2.328618 74 0.0413296 0.0959894 1.175212 
Turkey 1 4.9539 -0.214 54 0.00798 0.1375 1.34916 
U.K. 25 3.740425 0.2960048 2 0.0427025 0.1248714 1.143015 
ALL COUNTRIES 172 5.251377 -1.394631 36.89278 0.03164 0.4467254 1.09375 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
We will examine the distribution of trading volume between the home (foreign) and host (US) markets.  
We will discuss the results of univariate analysis on the distribution of trading volume and a multivariate 
analysis to examine the determinants of this distribution, similar to the method used by Wang and Zhou, 2012.   
 
Univariate Analysis 
 Our first regression analysis consisted of running the regression on each variable independently to 
evaluate the impact on the distribution of trading volume.  The dependent variable is the logged volume share 
ratio of the host versus home markets log(Volhost/Volhome).  All of the independent variables except culture are 
also logged to gain a more symmetric distribution of the residuals.  The factors: motive, culture, liquidity, and 
visibility are statistically significant at 1% or lower.  The volatility factor was not found to be significant. 
On the first factor, trading motive estimates are positively correlated to the trading volume distribution 
of cross-listed firms on the host market relative the volume on the home market.  For a more precise evaluation 
of trading motive, we ran the regression of the log of volume share on the log of the trading motive factor on 
two samples of the data, both of which consisting of markets with differing trading motives. One sample 
contains companies in the host market with hedging as the trading motive, and the other sample is of companies 
in host market with primarily speculative motive.  From these two samples, we find that when the host market 
motive is hedging and the home market is speculative, there is not an incentive for increased volume in the host 
market, the coefficient is negative; however, when the home market motive is hedging, the coefficient of motive 
factor is positive, indicating an increase in the distribution of volume in the host (US) market. In other words, a 
hedging motive in the home country leads to an increased proportion of trading in the host country relative to 
the home country, while speculative motive leads to a decrease in the volume share of the host country relative 
to the home country.   
On the second factor, culture difference, it is shown that an increase in the cultural difference results in 
an increase in the volume share for the US market.  For illiquidity ratio, the estimate shows that the more liquid 
the firms’ shares are on the host market compared the home market; there is an increase in volume share for the 
host market.  It is also shown for that the more visible a firm is in the host market relative to the home market, 
the more volume distribution in the host market.  As stated earlier, relative volatility, was not found to be 
significant in the univariate analysis.    
 
Table 5: Determinants of the Distribution of Trading Volume- Univariate 
Results are from "univariate" regressions involving only one independent variable per regression. 
The dependent variable is the log of trading volume share.   
Univariate Regression 
Dependent Variable: LOGVOLUMESHARE 
 
MOTIVE 
RATIO 
CULTURE 
DIFF 
ILLIQUIDITY 
RATIO 
VISIBILITY 
RATIO 
VOLATILITY 
RATIO 
Estimates 0.16062 0.01652 -0.98802 0.63018 0.04702 
t-statistics 3.71 7.99 -84.83 23.09 0.22 
Pr > |t| <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.828 
Obs-Co Yrs 1264 2210 2210 2187 2210 
Adj. R-square (%) 1.00 2.76 76.52 19.6 -0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 We next ran regressions using combinations of multiple variables, as well as, regressing all of the variables in one model.  These were the 
same independent variables that were run in the univariate analysis with the dependent variable being the volume share ratio of host versus home 
markets.  These combinations are shown in Table 6 as models 1 through 12.  Model 1 was a multivariate regression ran with all the variables.  All are 
significant with the exception of trading motive, with an R-squared of 77.62%.  Deviating from the univariate analysis, motive and volatility reversed 
places in terms of significance in the multivariate analysis. Model2 was ran disregarding the motive factor and in this case all of the factors are 
significant and the adjusted R-squared is at 77.8%.  Model2 dropped the culture factor, in addition to the motive factor and the remaining variables 
are still significant and the model’s adjusted R-squared is at 77.3%.  Model10 regress the volume share against motive culture and illiquidity.  In this 
case, motive is again insignificant, with culture still positively correlated and illiquidity being negatively correlated with an R-squared of 76.4%.  
Model7 consisted of motive, culture, illiquidity, and visibility.  Motive again remains insignificant in this combination.  Illiquidity remains significant 
and negatively correlated, and visibility is negatively correlated.  The R-squared for this combination is 77.22%.  Model5 are all the variables except 
for motive and visibility.  All variables included remains significant.  All signs are the same for the repeated variables, with the new variable, 
volatility, showing a positive correlation with an R-squared of 77.37%.  In summary, for Model2, as can be seen in Table 6, the fit (adjusted R-
squared) of the model is the best fit for the run with all variables, except for motive, with an r-squared of 77.8%. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Determinants of the Distribution of Trading Volume- Multivariate 
Dependent Variable: LOGVOLUMESHARE 
  
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12 
MOTIVE RATIO Coef. -0.01859 
  
-0.0198 
  
-0.01364 
  
-0.01287 -0.01377 
 
  
Std. Err. 0.020961 
  
0.02099 
  
0.021119 
  
0.0213 0.021346 
 
  
t-stat -0.89 
  
-0.94 
  
-0.65 
  
-0.6 -0.65 
 
  
P>|t| 0.375 
  
0.346 
  
0.518 
  
0.546 0.519 
 CULTURE DIFF Coef. 0.002986 0.002716 
  
0.002872 
 
0.003258 
 
0.00302 0.003481 
 
0.002873 
  
Std. Err. 0.0013 0.000993 
  
0.00101 
 
0.00131 
 
0.001027 0.001341 
 
0.00101 
  
t-stat 2.3 2.73 
  
2.84 
 
2.49 
 
2.94 2.6 
 
2.84 
  
P>|t| 0.022 0.006 
  
0.005 
 
0.013 
 
0.003 0.01 
 
0.004 
LIQUIDITY RATIO Coef. -1.08853 -1.05557 -1.06115 -1.09641 -0.9925 -0.99773 -1.08944 -1.05835 -0.98257 -0.997 -1.00601 -1.05246 
  
Std. Err. 0.019379 0.014234 0.014107 0.019105 0.011633 0.011504 0.019548 0.014347 0.011774 0.016236 0.015896 0.014473 
  
t-stat -56.17 -74.16 -75.22 -57.39 -85.32 -86.73 -55.73 -73.77 -83.45 -61.41 -63.29 -72.72 
  
P>|t| <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
VISIBILITY RATIO Coef. -0.17854 -0.14222 -0.14335 -0.17841 
  
-0.19102 -0.15642 
   
-0.15515 
  
Std. Err. 0.023336 0.017822 0.017844 0.023376 
  
0.023394 0.018088 
   
0.018064 
  
t-stat -7.65 -7.98 -8.03 -7.63 
  
-8.17 -8.65 
   
-8.59 
  
P>|t| <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
  
<.0001 <.0001 
   
<.0001 
VOLATILITY RATIO Coef. 0.71466 0.913381 0.918581 0.729537 0.905723 0.910663 
      
  
Std. Err. 0.148818 0.104523 0.104661 0.148931 0.103482 0.103634 
      
  
t-stat 4.8 8.74 8.78 4.9 8.75 8.79 
      
  
P>|t| <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
      
  Adj. R^2 77.62 77.8 77.73 77.54 77.37 77.29 77.22 76.96 76.59 76.38 76.28 77.03 
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Panel Data Analysis 
 We proceed and perform a panel data analysis in order to control for other variables that may be influencing volume 
distribution, but are not easily measured.  This also reduces the risk of bias in the OLS regression due to omitted variables.  
 
To undertand if there are significant grounds for changes within each of the companies volume shares as seen in the graph 
above.  We first run the fixed-effects model, which control for all time-invariant differences between the companies.  Results from 
fixed effects model show that approximately 96% of the of the variance in the log of volume share can be explained by the variables in 
the study.  The coefficient for motive is positive, and signifant.  The coefficient indicates that the trading volume share of the host 
relative to the home exchange increase 2.7% with every percent change in the trading motive factor.   The coefficient of liquidity, 
visibility, as well as volatility are also all significant, and have the assumed sign sign for their relatioship with trading volume share.   
The intraclass correlation shows that 88.9% of the variance is due to differences across the sample companies panels.  We test to see if 
time fixed effect is needed when running the Fixed Effect model, and finds that the time fixed-effects are needed in analysing this 
relationship.   
 
 
Table 7: Determinants of the Distribution of Trading Volume- FIXED EFFECT MODEL 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
MOTIVE RATIO 0.027839 0.008497 3.28 0.001 0.011167 0.044511 
ILLIQUIDITY RATIO -1.06699 0.014961 -71.32 <.0001 -1.09635 -1.03764 
VISIBILITY RATIO -0.15361 0.015958 -9.63 <.0001 -0.18492 -0.1223 
VOLATILITY RATIO 0.702332 0.06863 10.23 <.0001 0.567669 0.836996 
_cons -1.1266 0.106508 -10.58 <.0001 -1.33559 -0.91762 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
  This paper looked at various factors that may affect the trading volume distribution of 
American Depository Receipts.  We contribute to the development of this research area in that 
we explicitly associate the influence of trading motives of investors, a culture dimension factor: 
individualism, the daily stock price response associated with each dollar of trading volume, 
market to book ratio, as well as the relative volatility of stocks on the volume distribution of 
stocks from globally cross-listed firms.  In the multivariate regression, there is not a significant 
relationship with motive.  Controlling for time-specific effects, in a fixed effect model, we find 
that the relative motive measure of cross-listed firms on the host market to the home market has 
a positive relationship on the trading volume distribution.  Specifically, when looking at a small 
sample of firms with different motive factors, we find that hedging motive in the home country 
leads to an increased proportion of trading in the host country relative to the home country, while 
speculative motive leads to a decrease in the volume share of the host country relative to the 
home country.  In addition, in our fixed effect model, we also find a positive and significant 
association of the volatility factor with the trading volume share. 
 Culture difference is found to positively impact trading on the host market relative to the 
home market.   The relative liquidity of a firm’s stock in the host market compared to its home 
market is found to positively drive more volume proportion in the host market.  The more visible 
the firm stock in the host market relative to the home market, the higher the proportion of trade 
in the host market.   
57 
 
 
 
References  
 
 
Abdallah, W. and M. Goergen (2008). Does Corporate Control Determine the Crosslisting Location? 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 14: 183199.  
Ahern, K. R., Daminelli, D., & Fracassi, C. (2012). Lost in translation? The effect of cultural values 
on mergers around the world. Journal of Financial Economics. 
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1980). Dealership market: Market-making with inventory. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8(1), 31-53. 
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1991). Liquidity, maturity, and the yields on US Treasury securities. 
The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1411-1425. 
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1991). Volatility, efficiency, and trading: Evidence from the Japanese 
stock market. The Journal of Finance, 46(5), 1765-1789. 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., & Lauterbach, B. (1997). Market microstructure and securities values: 
Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial Economics, 45(3), 365-390. 
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal of 
financial markets, 5(1), 31-56. 
Bancel, F. and C. R. Mittoo (2001). European Managerial Perceptions of the Net Benefits of Foreign 
Stock Listings. European Financial Management, 7 (2): 213236.  
Bakshi, G. S., & Chen, Z. (1994). Baby boom, population aging, and capital markets. Journal of 
Business, 165-202. 
Baruch, S., Karolyi, G. A. and Lemmon, M. (2007). MultiMarket Trading and Liquidity: Theory and 
Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 62 (5): 21692200.  
Campbell, J., S. Grossman, and J.Wang (1993). Trading Volume and Serial Correlation in Stock 
Returns. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 905–939. 
Chordia, T., S.W. Huh, and A. Subrahmanyam (2007).The CrossSection of Expected Trading 
Activity.Review of Financial Studies, 20(3): 709740.  
Chowdhry, B. and V. Nanda (1991).Multimarket Trading and Market Liquidity. Review of Financial 
Studies,4 (3): 483511.  
Chui, Andy, Sheridan Titman, and K.C. John Wei, 2010, Individualism and momentum around the 
world, Journal of Finance 65, 361–392. 
Daugherty, M., Georgieva, D., (2011). Foreign cultures, Sarbanes Oxley Act and cross-delisting. 
Working Paper, Opus College of Business - University of St. Thomas, Minnesota. 
Dodd, O., Louca, C., & Paudyal, K. (2012). The Determinants of Trading Location of Cross-Listed 
Stocks.  Working Paper. 
58 
 
Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi and R. M. Stulz (2004). Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth 
More? Journal of Financial Economics, 71 (2): 205238.  
Foerster, S. R. and G. A. Karolyi (1998). Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: A Transaction  
Data Analysis of CanadaUS InterListings. Journal of International Financial Markets,  
Institutions and Money, 8 (34): 393412.  
Gagnon, L., & Karolyi, G. (2010). Do international cross-listings still matter?. Elsevier North-
Holland Publishers..  
Gallant, A. R., Rossi, P. E., & Tauchen, G. (1992). Stock prices and volume. Review of Financial 
studies, 5(2), 199-242. 
Glaser, M., & Weber, M. (2009). Which past returns affect trading volume?. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 12(1), 1-31. 
French, K., Roll, R., 1986. Stock return variances: the arrival of information and the reaction of 
traders. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 5}26.  
Halling, M., Pagano, M., Randl, O. and Zechner, J. (2008). Where is the Market? Evidence from 
Cross Listings in the US. The Review of Financial Studies, 21 (2): 725761.  
Halling, M., Moulton, P. C., & Panayides, M. (2011). Volume dynamics and multimarket trading. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-55. 
Hasbrouck, J., 1995. One security, many markets: determining the contributions to price discovery. 
Journal of Finance 50, 1175}1199.  
Hiemstra, C., & Jones, J. D. (1994). Testing for Linear and Nonlinear Granger Causality in the Stock 
 Price‐Volume Relation. The Journal of Finance, 49(5), 1639-1664. 
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and 
Organizations Across Nations, 2nd edn, Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Huddart, S., J. S. Hughes and M. K. Brunnermeier (1999).Disclosure Requirements and Stock  
Exchange Listing Choice in an International Context. Journal of Accounting and  
Economics,26 (13): 237269.  
Karolyi, G.A., 1998. Why do companies list shares abroad? A survey of the evidence and its 
managerial implications. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 7, 1–60.  
Karolyi, G. Andrew, 2006. The world of cross-listings and cross-listings of the world: Challenging 
conventional wisdom. Review of Finance 10 (1), 99–152.  
Karolyi, G.A., 2010. Corporate governance, agency problems and international cross-listings: a re-
assessment of the bonding hypothesis. Unpublished working paper. Cornell University.  
Karolyi, G.A. (2012). Corporate Governance, Agency Problems and International Crosslistings: A 
Defense of the Bonding Hypothesis. Emerging Markets Review, forthcoming.  
King, M. R., & Mittoo, U. R. (2007). What Companies Need to Know About International 
Cross‐Listing. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(4), 60-74. 
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 1315-1335. 
Llorente, G., Michaely, R., Saar, G., & Wang, J. (2002). Dynamic volume‐return relation of 
individual stocks. Review of Financial studies, 15(4), 1005-1047. 
59 
 
Licht, A. N. (2004). Legal plug-ins: Cultural distance, cross-listing, and corporate governance 
reform. Berkeley J. Int'l L., 22, 195. 
Madhavan, A. (2000). Market microstructure: A survey. Journal of Financial Markets, 3(3), 205-258. 
Odean, Terrance (1999). Do investors trade too much?, American Economic Review 89, 1279– 
1298. 
Pagano, M. (1989).Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity. Quarterly Journal of Economics,104 (2): 
255274.  
Saudagaran, S. (1988). An empirical study of selected factors influencing the decision to list on 
foreign stock exchanges. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1), 101-127. 
Sarkissian, S. and M. J. Schill (2004). The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence of Proximity 
Preference. Review of Financial Studies, 17 (3): 769809.  
Siegel, J. (2009). Is there a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross listings for Emerging -
economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico. Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 11711191.  
Statman, M., Thorley, S., & Vorkink, K. (2006). Investor overconfidence and trading volume. 
Review of Financial Studies, 19(4), 1531-1565. 
Wang, J., and Zhou, H. (2012).  The cross-country distribution of trading volume of globally multi-
listed firms.  Working Paper. 
  
60 
 
Vita 
Line Valerie Goss was born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.  She received a Bachelor of Science degree 
in Finance from Southern University-Baton Rouge in 2005.  She enrolled in the doctoral 
program at the University of New Orleans in 2008 and received her Master of Science degree in 
Financial Economics in 2012 and is a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Financial 
Economics in 2014. 
